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Abstract
This paper consists three chapters that the first two chapters study the flight-to-quality
sovereign debt crises while the third chapter studies the persistent market exclusion.
In the first two chapters, I characterize risk averse lenders’ optimal bond holdings
under which flight-to-quality debt crises can arise when there are large differences in bor-
rowing countries’ future default risks, and do this within a dynamic, stochastic general
equilibrium model. In this paper, there is a substitution effect between different bonds
because borrowing countries are competing with each other on international borrowing.
The relative differences in countries’ fundamentals, rather than the absolute funda-
mentals, determine the magnitude of the substitution effect, and thus the direction of
lenders’ cross-border capital movements. Specifically, when the differences in countries’
fundamentals are large enough, international lenders would like to move toward coun-
tries with relatively low future default risks, which improves these countries’ borrowing
conditions and deteriorates other countries’. Furthermore, safe countries accommodate
lenders’ capital movements by issuing more debt, which reduces the borrowing resources
available to other countries, further intensifies the difficulties faced by countries with
deteriorated borrowing conditions, and may finally force them to default. Such forces
were quantitatively important in explaining the empirical evidence from the recent Eu-
ropean Debt Crisis: European peripheries had difficulty raising funds in international
markets, while in countries such as Germany, and the United States, the yields declined
and the debt positions rose since 2010.
In the third chapter, I characterize the lender’s optimal recovery plan under which
debt recovery after default is decreasing in duration of market exclusion. In this paper,
the borrower’s endowment realization is private information that is persistent, and she
trades with the lender repeatedly. The lender has to choose a recovery plan which
specifies the amount of debt recovery the borrower should repay for market reentry
after default, while the borrower retains the right to decide on whether to repay the
debt recovery. In equilibrium, a borrower with a high endowment realization would like
to repay a higher debt recovery in order to regain market access earlier and to avoid
the high output cost. In contrast, a borrower with a low endowment realization would
ii
prefer to stay with the market exclusion in order to get a higher haircut on her debt.
As a consequence, the equilibrium in this paper features decreasing debt recovery and
increasing probability of market reentry over time after default, both are consistent
with the empirical findings in recent studies. I show that the lender choosing such a
plan to separate the borrower’s states by using time. In particular, given the lender has
to maintain market exclusion after default in order to support the ex ante equilibrium
borrowing in the market, she would prefer to allocate the ex post inefficiency in an
efficient way.
iii
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Chapter 1
Flight-to-Quality Debt Crises
1.1 Introduction
The Greek recession around late 2009 has caused sharply different impacts on sovereign
borrowers since 2010. As Figure 1.1 shows, debt yields in European peripheries in-
creased dramatically since 2010, which is the so-called European debt crisis. However,
debt yields in Germany, and the United States declined at the outset of the crisis1 .
That is, besides being immune to a crisis, these two countries2 had significant im-
provements3 in their borrowing conditions when European peripheries were struggling
with international borrowing. The declined yields in Germany, and the United States
are even more puzzling after considering the new bond issuance in these two countries:
As Figure 1.2 shows, debt positions in these two countries increase steadily since 2010.
The theoretical work on sovereign debt crises has successfully explained how and why
European peripheries have a sovereign debt crisis, and how the crisis that originated in
Greece was transmitted to other countries. Yet, it says nothing about why Germany,
and the United States had such different experiences during the recent crisis and how
1 Figure 1.1 plots only the average of yields for these two groups in order to demonstrate the pattern
of change clearly. Yields in individual countries within the same group change in exactly the same way
as the group average does. For example, yields in Germany, and the United States are hardly different
since 2010.
2 The list of countries that got benefited is longer than we have here and includes, e.g., Japan.
3 Given that the inflation rate is around 2%, the real return is around 0 and can even be negative
for more than 5 years, meaning that international lenders are paying for the privilege of holding safe
assets.
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such a phenomenon relates to the occurrence of a crisis in European peripheries.
This paper develops a multi-country model in which sovereign debt crises occur
in some countries, and improved borrowing conditions and increased debt positions
occur in other countries, and both are the consequence of international lenders’ optimal
portfolio choices. In particular, there exists a substitution effect between bonds issued
by different countries, which motivates lenders to adjust their bond holdings across
borders if borrowing countries’ fundamentals such as GDP are relatively different. When
international lenders are changing their bond positions across borders, countries with
relatively low future default risks can have improved borrowing conditions. Furthermore,
these countries also accommodate the cross-border capital movements by increasing
their new bond issuance, which will intensify the difficulties faced by countries with
deteriorated borrowing conditions, and may finally force these countries to default. Such
forces were quantitatively important to match the observed debt yield dynamics during
the recent European debt crises: from the perspective of one group of countries, both
yields and default probabilities are lower when the other group of countries have a lower
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endowment realization, the debt positions increase as a result of the better borrowing
conditions, and the correlations of yields among these two groups of countries are lower
when one group of countries is defaulting.
My framework builds on a sovereign default model with risk-averse lenders and
multiple borrowing countries, in the manner of [1] and [2]. In the model, two groups of
small countries are borrowing from competitive risk-averse lenders by issuing bonds with
default options. Borrowing countries in both groups are connected in the sense that they
are competing with each other for international borrowing. Lenders are investing in a
portfolio composed of bonds issued by different countries, and the concave payoff makes
them care about both the risk structure and the expected return. Hence, lenders choose
their bond positions in according to the relative soundness of countries’ fundamentals.
If the difference in fundamentals between these two groups is large, lenders would like
to change their bond positions across borders so that one group of countries have flight-
to-quality crises and the other group of countries have improved borrowing conditions.
Furthermore, the other group of countries accommodate the lenders’ capital flight by
4borrowing more, and finally have a combination of lower yields and higher debt positions.
By doing so, the model fully characterizes the conditions under which countries will
experience different patterns of capital flows, and to what extent some of them may be
forced to default.
To understand the mechanism of the model, consider a scenario in which GDP in
one group of countries (say, European peripheries) unexpectedly declines. Given the
fundamentals deteriorate, lenders would like to cut their bond holdings in European
peripheries, and thus impose a downward pressure on these countries’ borrowing condi-
tions. If European peripheries are the only borrowers in the market, because the lenders
are lack of other means to save, the magnitude of such a reduction may not be large
enough to force European peripheries to default. If instead, there is another group of
countries (say, Germany, and the United States) in the market, and more importantly,
fundamentals in these countries signal low enough future default risks relative to the
European peripheries. With better alternatives to save, lenders would have greater in-
centives to substitute from European peripheries to Germany, and the United States.
That is, because fundamentals in Germany, and the United States are relatively strong,
lenders’ capital retrenchment from European peripheries has been intensified to the ex-
tent that it may bring crises to these countries. Instead of the absolute fundamentals
in each group, such a behavior is driven by the relative difference between these two
groups of countries’ fundamentals.
In addition to the lenders’ incentive to shift across borders, Germany, and the United
States’ endogenous responses to the capital inflows also contribute to the crises happen-
ing in European peripheries. For instance, if Germany, and the United States cannot
increase the amount of bond issuance, the increased demand of bond in these coun-
tries will be fully reflected by decreases in their bond yields, which will in turn limit
the lenders’ incentives to shift toward these countries. In contrast, Germany, and the
United States in this paper accommodate lenders’ capital flight by increasing their debt
issuance, meaning that in addition to relatively low future default risks, bond supplies
in these countries also increase to meet the increased demand brought by international
lenders. Hence, the lenders’ incentive to adjust their bond positions have been greatly
encouraged, and it may become large enough to force European peripheries to default.
I call this type of sovereign debt crises as flight-to-quality debt crises, as lenders are
5retrenching out of European peripheries due to the fact that they want to move toward
Germany, and the United States, which have relatively low future default risks and
higher debt capacities.
The model is calibrated to Greece. Both the values of lender and borrower’s risk
aversion are borrowed from the standard international business cycle literature. The
lender’s discount factor is calibrated to match the average risk-free interest rate at 4%.
The borrower’s discount factor is calibrated to the average default probability at 5%.
The market reentry probability is calibrated to match the average market exclusion
after default to be around 4 years, as in [3]. The stochastic structure of endowment
realization is borrowed from [1], with the persistence as 0.88 and the shock as 0.03.
Other parameters are calibrated to match observed average yields in Greece, which is
around 5% before the crisis.
The numerical exercise shows that borrowing conditions in European peripheries de-
teriorate due to the presence of safe countries such as Germany and the United States:
When safe countries are also in the market, the average debt yields in European periph-
eries increases by 15%, which makes the average default probability increase by 20%,
compared to the case when safe countries default. Furthermore, the presence of safe
countries also crowd out sovereign borrowings in European peripheries: The debt to
GDP ratio decreases by 5%. Because the substitution effect is mainly driven by the
difference in countries’ fundamentals, changes in these three statistics are even more
dramatic when safe countries’ fundamentals are strong: When GDP in safe countries
has a high value, the average debt yields in European peripheries increase by 21%, the
average default probability increase by 25%, and the debt to GDP ratio decreases by
10%.
To show that the substitution effect reduces debt yields in safe countries and en-
courages them to borrow more, I then conduct an experiment under which GDP in
European peripheries unexpectedly drops by while GDP in safe countries has been held
constant. The simulation result shows that because lenders are moving toward safe
countries, debt yields decrease and debt positions increase in these countries even if
their GDP has been held constant. To see how the safe countries’ endogenous responses
affect the magnitude of lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior, I then compute the implied
6risk free interest rate by assuming that safe countries never default: The risk free in-
terest rate also decreases when European peripheries default, but with a much lower
magnitude. Since the non-defaultable nature makes the supply of bond more elastic in
safe countries, safe countries respond to the increased demand mostly by increasing the
bond issuance. Although the negative impact on European peripheries is the largest
when bond supply is elastic, it predicts that the decrease in safe countries’ debt yield is
too small to match the empirical evidence. Hence, it also justifies the model setting in
this paper under which safe countries are allowed to default.
The key driven factor of the model is the lenders’ willingness to avoid a loss when
facing with default risk, which is governed by the lenders’ risk aversion and periodic
income. I then conduct sensitivity analyses on how the probability of flight-to-quality
crises changes when these two parameters vary. The numerical exercise shows that either
with a higher risk aversion or a lower income, the changes in debt yields, default prob-
abilities, and debt positions across countries are larger, meaning that lenders are more
likely to commit flight-to-quality behavior across sovereign borders. Such an experiment
can be mapped onto the recent European debt crisis. Specifically, international lenders
suffer a lost on their investment after Greece defaults, which makes them poorer and
more sensitive to future default risks. Because European peripheries have relatively high
future default risks and smaller debt capacities compared to Germany, and the United
States, they become the targets from which lenders want to retrench out. Hence, the
lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior leaves other European peripheries with the contagion
of the Greek crisis, and at the same time, improved borrowing conditions and increased
debt positions in Germany, and the United States. Such a pattern of sovereign debt
crisis contagion is more consistent with empirical evidence from the recent crisis.
This paper develops a multi-country model in which sovereign debt crises occur
in some countries, and improved borrowing conditions and increased debt positions
occur in other countries, and both are the consequence of international lenders’ optimal
portfolio choices. In particular, there exists a substitution effect between bonds issued
by different countries, which motivates lenders to adjust their bond holdings across
borders if borrowing countries’ fundamentals such as GDP are relatively different. When
international lenders are changing their bond positions across borders, countries with
relatively low future default risks can have improved borrowing conditions. Furthermore,
7these countries also accommodate the cross-border capital movements by increasing
their new bond issuance, which will intensify the difficulties faced by countries with
deteriorated borrowing conditions, and may finally force these countries to default. Such
forces were quantitatively important to match the observed debt yield dynamics during
the recent European debt crises: from the perspective of one group of countries, both
yields and default probabilities are lower when the other group of countries have a lower
endowment realization, the debt positions increase as a result of the better borrowing
conditions, and the correlations of yields among these two groups of countries are lower
when one group of countries is defaulting.
My framework builds on a sovereign default model with risk-averse lenders and
multiple borrowing countries, in the manner of [1] and [2]. In the model, two groups of
small countries are borrowing from competitive risk-averse lenders by issuing bonds with
default options. Borrowing countries in both groups are connected in the sense that they
are competing with each other for international borrowing. Lenders are investing in a
portfolio composed of bonds issued by different countries, and the concave payoff makes
them care about both the risk structure and the expected return. Hence, lenders choose
their bond positions in according to the relative soundness of countries’ fundamentals.
If the difference in fundamentals between these two groups is large, lenders would like
to change their bond positions across borders so that one group of countries have flight-
to-quality crises and the other group of countries have improved borrowing conditions.
Furthermore, the other group of countries accommodate the lenders’ capital flight by
borrowing more, and finally have a combination of lower yields and higher debt positions.
By doing so, the model fully characterizes the conditions under which countries will
experience different patterns of capital flows, and to what extent some of them may be
forced to default.
To understand the mechanism of the model, consider a scenario in which GDP in
one group of countries (say, European peripheries) unexpectedly declines. Given the
fundamentals deteriorate, lenders would like to cut their bond holdings in European
peripheries, and thus impose a downward pressure on these countries’ borrowing condi-
tions. If European peripheries are the only borrowers in the market, because the lenders
are lack of other means to save, the magnitude of such a reduction may not be large
enough to force European peripheries to default. If instead, there is another group of
8countries (say, Germany, and the United States) in the market, and more importantly,
fundamentals in these countries signal low enough future default risks relative to the
European peripheries. With better alternatives to save, lenders would have greater in-
centives to substitute from European peripheries to Germany, and the United States.
That is, because fundamentals in Germany, and the United States are relatively strong,
lenders’ capital retrenchment from European peripheries has been intensified to the ex-
tent that it may bring crises to these countries. Instead of the absolute fundamentals
in each group, such a behavior is driven by the relative difference between these two
groups of countries’ fundamentals.
In addition to the lenders’ incentive to shift across borders, Germany, and the United
States’ endogenous responses to the capital inflows also contribute to the crises happen-
ing in European peripheries. For instance, if Germany, and the United States cannot
increase the amount of bond issuance, the increased demand of bond in these coun-
tries will be fully reflected by decreases in their bond yields, which will in turn limit
the lenders’ incentives to shift toward these countries. In contrast, Germany, and the
United States in this paper accommodate lenders’ capital flight by increasing their debt
issuance, meaning that in addition to relatively low future default risks, bond supplies
in these countries also increase to meet the increased demand brought by international
lenders. Hence, the lenders’ incentive to adjust their bond positions have been greatly
encouraged, and it may become large enough to force European peripheries to default.
I call this type of sovereign debt crises as flight-to-quality debt crises, as lenders are
retrenching out of European peripheries due to the fact that they want to move toward
Germany, and the United States, which have relatively low future default risks and
higher debt capacities.
The model is calibrated to Greece. Both the values of lender and borrower’s risk
aversion are borrowed from the standard international business cycle literature. The
lender’s discount factor is calibrated to match the average risk-free interest rate at 4%.
The borrower’s discount factor is calibrated to the average default probability at 5%.
The market reentry probability is calibrated to match the average market exclusion
after default to be around 4 years, as in [3]. The stochastic structure of endowment
realization is borrowed from [1], with the persistence as 0.88 and the shock as 0.03.
Other parameters are calibrated to match observed average yields in Greece, which is
9around 5% before the crisis.
The numerical exercise shows that borrowing conditions in European peripheries de-
teriorate due to the presence of safe countries such as Germany and the United States:
When safe countries are also in the market, the average debt yields in European periph-
eries increases by 15%, which makes the average default probability increase by 20%,
compared to the case when safe countries default. Furthermore, the presence of safe
countries also crowd out sovereign borrowings in European peripheries: The debt to
GDP ratio decreases by 5%. Because the substitution effect is mainly driven by the
difference in countries’ fundamentals, changes in these three statistics are even more
dramatic when safe countries’ fundamentals are strong: When GDP in safe countries
has a high value, the average debt yields in European peripheries increase by 21%, the
average default probability increase by 25%, and the debt to GDP ratio decreases by
10%.
To show that the substitution effect reduces debt yields in safe countries and en-
courages them to borrow more, I then conduct an experiment under which GDP in
European peripheries unexpectedly drops by while GDP in safe countries has been held
constant. The simulation result shows that because lenders are moving toward safe
countries, debt yields decrease and debt positions increase in these countries even if
their GDP has been held constant. To see how the safe countries’ endogenous responses
affect the magnitude of lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior, I then compute the implied
risk free interest rate by assuming that safe countries never default: The risk free in-
terest rate also decreases when European peripheries default, but with a much lower
magnitude. Since the non-defaultable nature makes the supply of bond more elastic in
safe countries, safe countries respond to the increased demand mostly by increasing the
bond issuance. Although the negative impact on European peripheries is the largest
when bond supply is elastic, it predicts that the decrease in safe countries’ debt yield is
too small to match the empirical evidence. Hence, it also justifies the model setting in
this paper under which safe countries are allowed to default.
The key driven factor of the model is the lenders’ willingness to avoid a loss when
facing with default risk, which is governed by the lenders’ risk aversion and periodic
income. I then conduct sensitivity analyses on how the probability of flight-to-quality
crises changes when these two parameters vary. The numerical exercise shows that either
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with a higher risk aversion or a lower income, the changes in debt yields, default prob-
abilities, and debt positions across countries are larger, meaning that lenders are more
likely to commit flight-to-quality behavior across sovereign borders. Such an experiment
can be mapped onto the recent European debt crisis. Specifically, international lenders
suffer a lost on their investment after Greece defaults, which makes them poorer and
more sensitive to future default risks. Because European peripheries have relatively high
future default risks and smaller debt capacities compared to Germany, and the United
States, they become the targets from which lenders want to retrench out. Hence, the
lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior leaves other European peripheries with the contagion
of the Greek crisis, and at the same time, improved borrowing conditions and increased
debt positions in Germany, and the United States. Such a pattern of sovereign debt
crisis contagion is more consistent with empirical evidence from the recent crisis.
1.2 Literature review
This work builds on the benchmark model of sovereign default analyzed by [4], [5] and
[6]. The models presented in these papers focus on sovereign default in the case of a
single borrowing country trades with risk-neutral lenders. [7, 2] and [1] study the case
of risk-averse lenders’ trade with multiple sovereign countries. They show that default
(or renegotiation) in one country makes the lenders poorer and to request a higher
premium on the other country’s bond, which will force the other country to default as
well. As a consequence, they are able to explain defaults and renegotiation happen in
tandem, which is a feature of sovereign defaults in the data. However, the wealth effect
addressed in their paper fails to explain why Germany, and the United States have
seen improved borrowing conditions, when there are crises in European peripheries. In
contrast, the substitution effect in this paper, which captures the lenders’ incentive to
distinguish bonds issued by different countries, is able to motivate lenders to commit
flight-to-quality behavior, and thus leaves countries with sharply different experiences
in the international borrowing market.
Another branch of sovereign debt literature examines cross-border capital flows dur-
ing a crisis, such as [8], [9, 5], [10], etc. In particular, [8] document that the crisis
11
country’s capital inflow changes from positive before the crisis to negative after. Al-
though cross-border capital outflows have long been viewed as the reason a sovereign
country becomes insolvent4 , there is a lack of theoretical studies to analyze why lenders
choose to dramatically retrench out of a country, and how such retrenchments would
affect other countries’ borrowing conditions.
More generally, this paper also contributes to sovereign debt literature on modeling
multiple borrowers and the interactions between them. The multiple big players setting
in previous literature feature strategic interactions between agents, which expose the
model to the risk of no pure strategy equilibrium. In this paper, risk-averse lenders
trade with two groups of small borrowing countries, each with a total mass of 1, which
is similar to the setting in large-game literature, including [14], [15] and [16]. As it has
been proved in previous studies, each borrowing country in this paper identifies itself as
a small player in the market, and takes the average response of other agents as given in
making its own decisions. Therefore, strategic interactions are shut off and the existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium can be guaranteed.
A recent wave of literature has examined why the flight-to-quality phenomenon
emerges and how it relates to the financial crises. [17] and [18] show that investors’
flight-to-quality amplifies initial negative shocks and, finally, leaves the economy in an
amplified downturn. However, neither of these papers looks into the interplay between
the flight-to-quality and default incentives. More recently, [19, 20] examine a problem
similar to mine by considering a coordination problem between lenders on rollovering one
of the two countries’ debt. They also find that relative fundamentals and debt capacities
determine the country from which lenders would like to retrench out. However, by
focusing on a static model of default, their model fails to generate richer dynamics on
debt yield, default probability and debt position. Furthermore, lenders in their model
are assumed to hold only one country’s bond to store the value, which contradicts
common practice among international investors.
Lastly, the model in this paper is also related to the literature on how a supplier
of safe asset would be affected due to investors’ flight-to-quality behavior. [21] find
that the US Treasury yields declined by 73 basis points, on average, from 1926 to 2008
because investors valued the liquidity and safety of the US Treasury. [22] show that
4 See, for example, [6], [11], [12] and [13].
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the low external borrowing cost in United States encourages borrowing and increases
the leverage level in domestic institutions. [19, 20] show that debt yields drop in safe
countries because international lenders are choosing these countries’ bond as a mean to
store the value. Similar to this paper, safe countries such as Germany, and the United
States in their paper accommodate the increased demand by issuing more debt, and
finally have a combination of improved borrowing conditions and higher debt positions.
1.3 Model
The model consists of agents who live for infinite periods, and there is a single good
in each period. There are two groups of countries, denoted by j ∈ {h, f}. Each group
contains a continuum with measure one of identical small open economies5 . There
are three types of agents in this model: households, governments, and international
lenders. There is a government and a representative household in each country. For
simplicity, I will mainly focus on the representative country in group h in laying out the
model; everything can easily be applied to group f countries, due to the symmetry of
the problem.
The household’s preferences are
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (ch,t)
]
where ch,t denotes its consumption at period t. For simplicity, the subscript t is omitted
in laying out the model in the following sections. The periodic utility function u (·) is
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. Each period, the
household receives a stochastic endowment, yh, which is public information and has a
bounded support of
[
y, y
] ∈ R. Notice that endowment realizations are assumed to be
the same across countries within one group. Thus, the only difference in endowment
realizations is among these two groups. Finally, yh follows a Markov process with
transition function f (y′h| yh).
5 The main purpose of this setting is to address the similarities shared by the same type of countries
in the sovereign debt market—for example, emerging market economies versus developed economies.
The assumption can possibly be loosened by allowing idiosyncratic risk for every country. However, it
will greatly complicate my analysis—without bringing any key insights—once idiosyncratic risk is not
big enough to overturn the similarities shared by countries within the same group.
13
The government in each country trades with international lenders on defaultable
bonds. It is benevolent, in the sense that its goal is to maximize its domestic households’
utility. Each period, after both yh and yf realize, the government first chooses whether
to default on the matured debt, dh
dh =
{
0, repay
1, default
The default decision is public knowledge once it has been made. Thus, all govern-
ments and lenders have perfect information about default decisions before taking any
further action. Once a government chooses to default, it is immediately excluded from
international borrowing. The defaulting country also suffers an output cost similar to
[6]; that is, the endowment process changes to ydh after the government defaults
ydh =
{
(1− λ)E (yh) if yh ≥ E (yh)
yh if yh < E (yh)
where λ ∈ (0, 1). If the government repays, then given the bond price schedule q′h,
it is allowed to choose the new bond issuance, b′h. The new bond issuance is assumed
to have a finite support,
[
b, b
]
6 . The budget constraint can thus be summarized as
ch + (1− dh) bh = (1− dh)
(
yh + q
′
hb
′
h
)
+ dhy
d
h
Furthermore, the country that defaults at period t will have a probability of θ ∈ (0, 1)
to re-access the market at period t+ 1, as in [6].
The governments are the only strategic agents in this model. Similar to the one
borrower setting in [12] and [6], when the government makes its decision, it takes into
account the decision’s influence on the price of its own debt. Furthermore, since all
countries borrow from the same lenders, there is a linkage between borrowing coun-
tries. However, the linkage in this paper differs from the one in [1], who consider only
two countries, and the government in each country is a big player in the international
borrowing market. In their paper, there are strategic interactions between these two
big borrowing countries, which could possibly impede the existence of a pure strategy
6 Given that the endowment process is bounded and the debt is defaultable, this assumption is
innocuous if b is sufficiently low and b is sufficiently high.
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equilibrium. In contrast, the model in this paper assumes a continuum of countries
in each group, and each government recognizes that any single country can be ignored
compared to the sum of other countries in the international borrowing market. There-
fore, the government ignores its own actions’ impacts on the international borrowing
market and takes the average responses of other governments into account instead of
any specific (other) country’s. Such a large-game setting was firstly formulated by [14],
then developed by [15]. It has been proved by [16] that the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium is guaranteed if there is a continuum of agents. Intuitively, because any
single government ignores its own influence on other countries’ borrowing conditions,
the model here doesn’t have the strategic interactions that may impede the existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium.
To formulate the problem, define B, y and D as
B = (Bh, Bf ) ,y = (yh, yf ) ,D = (Dh, Df )
where Bj is the average indebtedness of group j countries and Dj is the ratio of default
in group j:
Bj =
∫ 1
0
bj (i) di
Dj =
∫ 1
0
dj (i) di
In equilibrium, since countries within the same group are assumed to receive the same
endowment realization each period, it will be non-optimal for a single country to deviate
by choosing a different default decision or a different debt level. Thus, in equilibrium,
countries in group j would all default or all repay, Dj ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, the individual
debt level equals the average indebtedness within a group
bj (i) = Bj , ∀i
Therefore, the net repayment from group j countries can be written as
NRj =
∫ 1
0
[1− dj (i)]
{
bj (i)− q′j
[
b′j (i)
]
b′j (i)
}
di
= (1−Dj)
[
Bj − q′j
(
s,B′j
)
B′j
]
The arguments above imply that instead of the whole distribution of initial debt level
in each group, I only need to keep track of the average indebtedness and the default
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ratio within the group to formulate the problem. Each period, with the initial aggregate
state s = (B,y), the timing of actions is similar to [6] and can be summarized as:
1. (yh, yf ) realizes, then given (s, bh), the government decides whether to default or
not, dh.
2. If the government defaults, it simply consumes ydh and will reenter the market with
probability θ at the next period.
3. If the government repays, taking q′h = q (s, b
′
h) as given, it chooses how much to
borrow, b′h.
4. International lenders, taking the bond price schedule as given, choose how much
to lend, b˜′h.
5. The equilibrium condition requires b′h = b˜
′
h.
1.3.1 The Borrower’s and Lender’s Problems
To formulate the government’s problem in a recursive way, I first consider the problem
at the second stage faced by a government that has already made a default decision.
The government takes as given the rule on the evolution on the aggregate state, s, which
can be summarized as
s′ = H (s)
Then the government’s value function, given it repays, can be written as
V nd (s, bh) = max
b′h
{
u
(
yh + q
′
hb
′
h − bh
)
+ βE
[
V
(
s′, b′h
)]}
(1.1)
Similarly, the value for the government that decided to default can be written as
V d (s) = u
(
ydh
)
+ βE
[
θV nd
(
s′, 0
)
+ (1− θ)V d (s′)]
Back to the first stage: Given the value on default or repay, the government’s prob-
lem at the default decision can be written as
V (s, bh) = max
dh
[
(1− dh)V nd (s, bh) + dhV d (s)
]
(1.2)
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The equilibrium outcome can be summarized by the government’s default decision and
new bond issuance, d (s, bh) and b
′ (s, bh), as well as consumption c (s, bh), and values
V (s, bh), V
nd (s, bh), and V
d (s).
There is a continuum with measure one of identical international lenders who are
competitive. The representative lender is risk averse and has a preference as
E
[
δtψ (cL,t)
]
where cL,t is the lender’s consumption at period t. ψ (·) is continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing, and strictly concave. The lender’s discount factor is assumed to be
greater than β, 0 < β < δ < 1, in order to guarantee borrowing in equilibrium. Each
period, the lender receives a fixed amount of endowment, yL. The lender takes as given
the evolution of aggregate state s′ = H (s). Also, taking as given the bond price schedule
Q
(
s, b˜′j
)
, the lender decides how much to lend to each country in group j, b˜′j , and how
much to consume. The lender’s budget constraints can be summarized as
cL = yL +
∑
j=h,f
∫ 1
0
[1− dj (i)]
[
b˜j (i)−Q′h (i) b˜′j (i)
]
di (1.3)
where i ∈ [0, 1] denotes an individual country within one group and j ∈ {h, f} denotes
the group. The equilibrium condition requires b˜′j (i) = bj (i) ,∀i, j. Thus, the lender’s
value function is
VL (s) = max
l′
{
ψ (cL) + δE
[
VL
(
s′
)]}
(1.4)
where cL is defined in equation (1.3). From the lender’s problem, we can solve for the
bond price function as
q′h = q
(
s, b˜′j
)
= E
[
δψ′ (c′L)
ψ′ (cL)
(
1− d′h
)]
(1.5)
1.3.2 Equilibrium
I focus on a recursive Markov equilibrium in which all decision rules are solely the
functions of state variables (s, bh).
Definition 1.1. A recursive Markov equilibrium for this economy consists of (i) coun-
tries’ policy functions for repayment, borrowing, and consumption, b′ (s, bh), d (s, bh),
and c (s, bh), and values V (s, bh), V
nd (s, bn), and V
d (s); (ii) lenders’ policy functions
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for lending choices and consumption
{
b˜′ (s) , cL (s)
}
and value function VL (s); (iii) the
functions for bond price q
(
s, b′j
)
; and (iv) equilibrium prices of debt Q
(
s,D,B′, b˜′j
)
;
(v) the evolution of the aggregate state H (s) such that, given that the initial debt levels
are the same across countries within each group and bj,0 = b˜j,0,∀j:
1. Taking as given the bond price, the evolution of the aggregate state H (s), the
evolution of default ratio D (s), and the evolution of average new bond issuance
B (s), the policy and value functions for countries solve the borrower’s problem in
equation (1.2).
2. Taking as given the bond prices Q
(
s,D,B′, b˜′j
)
and evolution of the aggregate
statesH (s), the policy functions and value functions for the lenders
{
b˜′ (s) , cL (s)
}
solve the lender’s problem in equation (1.4).
3. Taking as given countries’ policy and value functions, the bond price function
satisfies equation (1.5).
4. The prices of debt Q
(
s,D,B′, b˜′j
)
clear the bond market for every country,
bj (i) = b˜j (i), ∀j ∈ {h, f}.
5. The goods market clears, ch + cf + cL = yh + yf + yL.
6. The law of motions for the evolution aggregate states s′ = H (s) is consistent with
countries’ decision rules and shocks.
1.4 Flight-to-Quality Sovereign Debt Crises
In this section, I construct a two-periods example to intuitively illustrate the conditions
under which a sovereign debt crisis occurs in group h countries, especially when group f
countries are experiencing improvements in their borrowing conditions. The numerical
analysis of the full model with infinite periods and the quantitative results will be
presented in section 2.1.
Consider a two-periods version of my model in which endowment realizations in both
groups of countries are stochastic in period 1, (yh, yf ), but both are fixed in sense that
the endowment in period 2 equal to the endowment in period 1
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y′h = yh
y′f = yf
That is, the endowment process is perfectly persistent and the only source of uncer-
tainty is from the endowment realizations in period 1. To make the problem meaningful,
in period 1, both groups are in the market with positive matured debt levels bh ≥ 0 and
bf ≥ 0, and are both deciding whether to default on the debt or repay. For simplicity,
I assume that θ = 0, meaning that a country defaults in period 1 will be permanently
excluded out of the market for both periods. Furthermore, a country under market
exclusion is assumed to suffer from an output cost so that endowment process changes
to be ydh as I’ve defined before. If the country chooses to repay, then it is allowed to
choose the new bond issuance, b′h.
1.4.1 Borrower’s Decisions
Because the problem only has two periods, I can solve it by backward inductions. In
period 2, the country either chooses to repay the debt if it borrowed in period 1 or stays
with market exclusion. Specifically, the country only chooses to repay the debt b′h in
period 2 if
yh − b′h ≥ ydh
⇒
b′h ≤ yh − ydh
Let b
′
h = yh − ydh, it is essentially a borrowing limit in period 1 that the country
can leave to be repaid in period 2. Because period 2’s endowment realization is fixed,
there is no equilibrium default in period 2. However, the option of default in period 2
imposes a borrowing limit in period 1 such that the bond price equals to 0 if the country
would like to borrow more than the limit. I further make the Assumption 1.1 below to
abstract from the characterization of the borrower’s new bond issuance in period 1.
Assumption 1.1. β is sufficiently low such that a country always want to borrow up
to the borrowing limit in period 1 if it already chose to repay bh, b
′
h = b
′
h.
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In period 1, the value of repay
V nd (s, bh) = u
(
yh + q
′
hb
′
h − bh
)
+ βu
(
yh − b′h
)
and the value of default is
V d (s) = (1 + β)u
(
ydh
)
and the country chooses to repay only if
V nd (s, bh) ≥ V d (s) (1.6)
From equation (1.6), it is easy to see that the interdependence between countries’ default
and borrowing decisions is through the channel of bond price where the endowment
realization in group f countries can affect the borrowing conditions in group h countries.
However, before proceeding to the discussions of the interdependence, I need to firstly
state several results on the borrower’s decision rules.
Lemma 1.1. There exists a cutoff function on yh, yˆ (B, yf , bh) such that the country
repays if yh ≥ yˆ (B, yf , bh), and defaults otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
Lemma 1.2. At the lowest level of yh such that the country chooses to repay in period
1, the net repayments in both periods are equalized
bh − q′hb′h = b′h
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2.
Lemma 1.3. The net repayment in period 1, bh−q′hb′h is strictly decreasing in yh, while
the net repayment in period 2, b′h is strictly increasing in yh.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
Lemma 1.4. Under the levels of yh such that the country strictly prefer to repay in
period 1, the net repayment in period 2 is strictly higher than the net repayment in
period 1
b′h > bh − q′hb′h
and their difference, (1 + q′h) b
′
h − bh is increasing in yh.
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Proof. See Appendix A.1.4.
In summary, countries are more likely to choose to repay in period 1 if they have
a higher endowment realization. They would choose the spread the burden equally
into both periods when they are indifferent between repay and default. Furthermore,
because the higher endowment increases the borrowing limit in period 1, countries would
increase their new bond issuance in period 1, which is also their net repayments in period
2, and thus reduces their net repayments in period 1. As a consequence, given countries
strictly prefer to repay, a higher endowment realization shifts lenders’ consumption from
current period to the next period.
1.4.2 Two Effects
In order to analyze the interdependence between these two groups of countries’ default
decisions, I first analyze how bond prices in group h countries can be affected by the
endowment realization in group f countries. Then, the analysis of the default decision
can be transformed into analysis of the best response functions. Because there is no
further uncertainty in period 2 endowment realizations, lenders would price the bond
solely base on their intertemporal discount factor. In particular, if group f countries
default, then the bond price in group h countries is independent of yf , which can be
written as
q′h =
δψ′ (yL + b′h)
ψ′
(
yL + bh − q′hb′h
) (1.7)
If instead, group f countries repay and issue new bond, then the bond price in group h
countries is
q′h =
δψ′
(
yL + b
′
h + b
′
f
)
ψ′
(
yL + bh + bf − q′hb′h − q′fb′f
) (1.8)
Equation (1.8) shows that there are two channels through which the endowment
realization in group f countries can affect the borrowing condition in group h countries:
the wealth effect and the substitution effect. To briefly discuss these two effects, in
the next two paragraphs I will take an increase in endowment realization in group f
countries to provide some intuitions on how these two effects would influence the bond
price.
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First, an increase in yf improves the borrowing conditions in group h countries
through the wealth effect. In particular, compared to the case when group f countries,
if yf increases to make group f countries repay, lenders become wealthier and more
willing to hold group h bonds. Intuitively, the lender uses a portfolio composed of bonds
from these two groups of countries as a tool to save for the next period. Compared to
the case when group f countries defaults, a higher yf encourages group f countries to
repay. With a higher wealth, lenders will increase their bond holdings in both groups
of countries, which increases the bond price in group h countries. As a consequence,
it also encourages group h countries to repay. I call such an effect as the wealth effect,
which has also been widely discussed in [1] and [23].
Second, given group f countries choose to repay, an increase in yf also tightens the
borrowing conditions in group h countries through the substitution effect. Specifically,
because the endowment process is persistent, a higher yf implies that y
′
f is more likely
to concentrate on high values, which signals lower future default risks and higher debt
capacities in group f countries. Given lenders’ intertemporal substitution (or saving
schedule), the reduced default risk in group f countries induces the lenders to shift
toward the group f bond. Such a portfolio rebalance reduces lenders’ demand of the
bond in group h countries, and thus tightens the bond price schedule. Intuitively,
because both groups of countries are borrowing from the common international lenders,
an improvement in group f ’s endowment implies that group h countries become less
competent in the international borrowing market, which makes their bond becomes less
appealing to the lenders. I call such an impact as the substitution effect, which is the
main mechanism through which this model can generate flight-to-quality behavior by
the lenders.
I use the Lemma 1.5 to demonstrate how the repayment decision by group f countries
affects group h bond price positively, which is the wealth effect.
Lemma 1.5. When group h countries strictly prefer to repay, then at the lowest level
of yf such that group f countries repay in period 1, the bond price in group h countries
is strictly higher than the bond price when group f countries default.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.5.
Lemma 1.5 says that compared to the case when group f countries default, the fact
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that group f countries choose to repay improves the borrowing condition in group h
countries, and I call it the wealth effect. As I’ve discussed before, since the lenders are
investing on bonds issued by both groups of countries, if they can guarantee repayments
from group f countries, their will thus be less reluctant to invest on the bond issued
by group h countries, which will improve the bond price schedule provided to group h
countries.
I then use the Lemma 1.6 to show that a higher endowment realization in group f
countries induces these countries to borrow more in period 1, which will in turn tighten
the borrowing conditions in group h countries, and I call it the substitution effect.
Lemma 1.6. Given group f countries repay, the bond price in group h countries, q′h is
strictly decreasing in the endowment realization in group f countries, yf .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.6.
Lemma 1.6 shows that a higher yf deteriorates borrowing conditions in group h
countries. From the borrower’s problem, it is easy to see that the group h countries are
more likely to default with a lower bond price schedule, q′h. Thus, a higher yf forces
group h countries to be more likely to default, and I call it the substitution effect.
In this special case, the bond supplies in both groups are inelastic, and the bond
prices are determined in the sense that lenders’ demand of bond equals the total supply.
A higher yf expands the debt limit in group f countries, which induces group f countries
to increase their bond supply. Given any bond price, the increased supply of bond in
group f countries reduces the lenders’ demand of group h bonds. Such a reduction is
reflected at a declined bond price in group h countries, and thus forces group h countries
to be more likely to default in period 1, as can be seen from the borrower’s problem.
Intuitively, the increased supply in group f countries crowds out the demand of group
h bond.
Notice that the bond price in group f countries is also decreasing in yf in this
example, which contradicts to the empirical evidence during the recent crisis. The
reason is because the supply of bond in group f countries is perfectly inelastic. Hence,
group f countries will fully exhaust the increased demand and thus make group f bond
price decrease. If instead, the endowment realization in the future is stochastic, the
supply of bond in group f countries is elastic. As a consequence, group f countries
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would respond to an increasing demand by both issuing more bonds and having a lower
yield, as in my quantitative study in later sections.
In summary, these two effects show that the endowment in group f countries affect
the borrowing conditions in group h countries in two different directions. In particular,
consider a case that group f countries default and the endowment increases to make
these countries to choose to repay, the bond price in group h countries jumps because of
the wealth effect. Furthermore, given group f countries repay, the bond price in group
h countries decreases as the endowment in group f countries further increases because
of the substitution effect.
In this model, the total effect through which group f countries’ endowment can
affect the default decisions by group h countries is a combination of the wealth effect
and the substitution effect. In particular, if the wealth effect dominates, the presence of
group f countries in the market benefits group h countries by improving their borrowing
conditions. In contrast, if the substitution effect dominates, it implies that borrowing
conditions in group h countries deteriorate because lenders are withdrawing their money
from these countries and, at the same time, moving toward group f countries. With
an intermediate level of yf , an increase in yf is more likely to encourage the group f
countries to repay the debt instead of issue more debt. Hence, the wealth effect is more
likely to dominate at these levels of yf . On the other hand, if yf is sufficiently large, a
further increase in yf will not change these countries’ repayment incentives significantly.
Instead, a higher yf improve group f countries’ debt capacities and makes them issue
even more debt, which makes the substitution effect to dominate. Intuitively, because
the substitution effect is based on the relative difference between these two groups
of countries’ fundamentals, it is most intensified when group f countries have a high
enough endowment realization relative to group h countries. I then use Proposition 1.1
to summarize the arguments above, which will also be demonstrated by the quantitative
study in later sections.
Proposition 1.1. If Df = 1, q
′
h is independent of yf . If Df = 0, there exist a threshold,
Y ∈ [y, y], such that q′h ∣∣Df=1 ≥ q′h ∣∣Df=0 if yf ≥ Y and q′h ∣∣Df=1 < q′h ∣∣Df=0 if yf < Y.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.7.
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1.4.3 The Interdependence
To see the interdependence between these two groups of countries’ default decisions, I
then map the default decisions into the space of endowment realizations. By Lemma
1.1, there exists a threshold yˆ (B, yf , bh) such that a country chooses to repay only
if its endowment realization is higher than yˆ (B, yf , bh). In this sense, yˆ (B, yf , bh)
is also the best response function with regard to the country’s default decision. Be-
cause the bond price is the only channel through wich group h countries’ default
decisions can be affected by group f countries’ choices, Proposition 1.1 shows that
yˆ (B, yf , bh) is independent of yf if Df = 1. On the other hand, if Df = 1, the
shape of yˆ (B, yf , bh) depends on the value of yf . In particular, there exist a thresh-
old, Y ∈ [y, y], such that yˆ (B, yf , bh) ∣∣Df=1 ≥ yˆ (B, yf , bh) ∣∣Df=0 if yf ≥ Y and
yˆ (B, yf , bh)
∣∣
Df=1 < yˆ (B, yf , bh)
∣∣
Df=0 if yf < Y.
Figure 1.3: A Group h Country’s Best Response
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I plot both yˆ (B, yf , bh)|Df=0 and yˆ (B, yf , bh)|Df=1 in Figure 1.3 to summarize the
analysis above, and to characterize group h countries’ best response. These two lines
have divided the endowment space into four regions (I, II, III, and IV), with each of
them representing different default decisions in group h countries. Specifically, group h
countries default in region I and repay in region IV regardless of the default decisions by
group f countries. In region II, both groups of countries jointly default or repay. The
most important one is region III, in which group h countries repay if group f countries
default, and default if group f countries repay. By symmetry, the best response function
by group f countries is similar to that for group h countries.
To characterize the equilibrium outcome, I put together the best response functions
by both groups of countries in Figure 1.4. For simplicity, the graph is depicted in the
case of Bh = Bf . The best response functions separate the endowment space into eight
regions, with each of them represents different equilibrium outcomes. In equilibrium,
both groups of countries repay in region II, IV, and VII, while both groups of countries
default in region VI. In regions I and III, group h countries default and group f countries
repay. Symmetrically, in regions V and VIII, group h countries repay, while group f
countries default. These equilibrium default decisions are summarized below,
II ∪ IV ∪VII = {(yh, yf )|Dh = 0, Df = 0}
VI = {(yh, yf )|Dh = 1, Df = 1}
I ∪ III = {(yh, yf )|Dh = 1, Df = 0}
V ∪VIII = {(yh, yf )|Dh = 0, Df = 1}
The equilibrium outcome in region III in Figure 1.3 (and, symmetrically, region V)
is of particular interest in this paper because group h countries would find it optimal to
repay if group f countries default7 , Df = 1. In other words, the presence of group f
countries in the international borrowing market forces group h countries to default. To
better illustrate the intuitions, consider two points, a and b, as both have been depicted
in Figure 1.4, where a ∈ III and b ∈ IV. Notice that the only difference between a and b
is the value of group f endowment realization: Point a has a higher yf than point b. At
both points, the low value of yh implies that group h countries have to rollover most (or
7 This is not true in equilibrium, but it is helpful to take as a benchmark to understand why group
h countries default in this region.
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Figure 1.4: Equilibrium Outcomes (Bh = Bf )
accumulate more) of their debt into the next period. As a consequence, international
lenders are worrying about the group h countries’ abilities to service their debt at the
next period. If group f countries default8 , lenders’ worries would not be turned into a
large reduction in the demand of group h bond, because there is nowhere else for lenders
to go. In contrast, if group f countries repay, which offers the lenders an alternative to
invest. At point b, the relative difference in endowment realizations is not big enough,
which implies that the group f bond is not a good substitute for the group h bond. As a
consequence, the lender will not respond to high future default risk in group h countries
by dramatically moving toward group f countries9 . If instead, group f countries have
a high endowment realization (at point a), the difference in endowment realizations is
big enough to motivate lenders to dramatically substitute from the group h bond to the
group f bond, or in other words, to commit flight-to-quality behavior. Intuitively, in
this case, the group f bond serves as a safe asset for lenders to store the value, which
makes lenders to dramatically retrench out of group h countries. Such a flight-to-quality
8 Imagine that group h countries are the only borrowing countries, as in settings in the literature
with a single borrowing country, e.g., [6].
9 At point b, the presence of group f countries actually helps group h countries because of the
wealth effect.
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behavior by international lenders would definitely leave group h countries with sovereign
debt crises and group f countries with improved borrowing conditions.
Region III in Figure 1.3 highlights the forces that lead to different changes in bor-
rowing conditions across countries due to the substitution effect. Intuitively, risk-averse
lenders are confronted by a tradeoff between future default risk and expected return in
choosing their bond holdings. When yh is relatively low, lenders’ desire to earn positive
returns from lending is dominated by the desire to get the promised return. The high
value of the endowment realization in group f countries also intensifies such an incen-
tive, and induces lenders to move toward group f bonds to guarantee the safety of their
investment. In this sense, the substitution effect is equivalent to an additional premium
requested for the group h bonds. In certain circumstances, such an additional premium
is big enough to force group h countries to default, which results in sovereign debt crises.
That is, the lender’s incentive to take preventive measures has successfully transformed
a possible default in the future into a default current period. I call lenders’ behavior in
this region flight-to-quality, because they are more willing to hold (relative) safe assets
when there is likely to be financial turmoil. Lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior is well
documented by previous studies as a manifestation of international financial crises; e.g.,
[18] and [17]. For further reference, I will call the sovereign debt crisis that occurs in
region III (and, similarly, region V) as a flight-to-quality sovereign debt crisis.
During the recent Euro Zone Crisis, Germany, and the United States experienced
improved borrowing conditions while, some the European peripheries continued to have
difficulties in borrowing abroad. In this paper, I argue that the substitution effect
provides a reason for the decreased debt–yield rate observed in those countries during
the European debt crisis. As I’ve argued above, the substitution effect in region III
indicates that lenders reduce their bond holdings in group h countries and, at the same
time, increase their bond holdings in group f countries. Other things being equal,
capital flight toward group f countries would push up the bond prices or, similarly,
push down the bond yield rate in these countries. The result is consistent with the
finding by [21], in the sense that they find that US Treasury yields declined by 73
basis points, on average, from 1926 to 2008 because investors valued the liquidity and
safety of US treasuries. However, [21] obtained their results by exogenously assuming
that investors prefer U.S. treasuries, and thus have been able to calculate how such a
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preference affects the yields on U.S. treasuries. In contrast, the result in this paper is
endogenous based on the lender’s optimal choice on bond positions across countries.
Notice that Figure 1.4 depicts in the case of unique equilibrium. Although a pure
strategy equilibrium can be guaranteed in the large-game setting in this paper, it is
not necessarily the only one10 . In contrast, the wealth effect examined in this paper
could complicate my analysis by introducing multiple equilibria, as discussed by [1].
Since the wealth effect is more prominent in the case when both groups of countries
have similar fundamentals, the problem of multiple equilibria is more likely to emerge
in regions II, IV, and VII. However, this paper focus on region III (or region V), in
which both groups of countries have sharply different fundamentals. In this region,
the wealth effect is dominated by lenders’ incentive to distinguish these two groups of
countries when lending money. In the quantitative study in later sections, the problem
of multiple equilibria has been taken care by choosing the equilibrium that maximizes
the sum of both groups of borrowing countries’ utilities.
10 For discussions of the existence and properties of pure strategy equilibrium in large games, see
[14], [15], and [16].
Chapter 2
Flight-to-Quality Debt Crises:
Quantitative Analysis
2.1 Quantitative Analysis
I solve the infinite periods model numerically and analyze the interactions between these
two groups of countries in the international borrowing market. Specifically, I analyze
how the fundamentals and choices in one group of countries would affect bond prices and
default decisions in the other group. I show that the substitution effect is quantitatively
important, especially when one group of countries are on the brink of defaulting.
2.1.1 Calibration
The periodic utility function for the borrower is CRRA,
u (c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
Following common business cycle studies, I set the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution (IES), 1/σ to 1/2. The periodic utility function for the lender is logarithmic1
,
ψ (cL) = log cL
1 The lender’s utility function would be loosened to be CRRA in the section of sensitivity analysis.
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The length of a period is one year. The stochastic process for endowment is inde-
pendent across these two groups and follows a lognormal AR(1) process,
log (yt+1) = ρ log (yt) + εt+1
with E
(
ε2
)
= η2. The endowment process in one group of countries is assumed to
be independent of the endowment process in the other group of countries. I use the
method proposed by [24] to discretize the shock into a Markov Chain. The endowment
space
[
y, y
]
is the set of [0.83, 1.21] with an unconditional mean equals to 1.04, and it
has discretized into 11 grids. The debt space
[
b, b
]
is discretized into 31 grids. The
numerical algorithm is explained in detail in Appendix A.2.
Eight parameters are calibrated: I follow [1] to set up the stochastic structure for
borrower’s endowment process and the lender’s fixed endowment. The reentry proba-
bility θ is set to be 0.282 to capture the fact that, on average, the duration of market
exclusion is around 4 years; see, for example, [3]. The value of default cost λ is bor-
rowed from [6], which has been set to be 0.016. On the other hand, the lender’s discount
factor, δ, is set to match with the average risk-free interest rate, which equals to 4%.
Finally, the borrower’s discount rate β, is set to match with two moments: the average
default probability, 5%; and thus the mean of yield rate in Greece, 5.6%. Calibrated
parameters and their matching moments are summarized in Table 2.1.
Value Target
Borrower’s IES 1/σ = 1/2 Standard Value
Stochastic structure for shocks ρ = 0.88, η = 0.03 [1]
Output cost after default λ = 0.016 [6]
Reentry probability θ = 0.282 average Market Exclusion, 4 years
Borrower’s discount factor β = 0.90 Mean Default Probability, 5%
Lender’s discount factor δ = 0.96 Mean Risk Free Interest Rate, 4%
Lender’s endowment yL = 1.4 [1]
Table 2.1: Parameter Values
2.1.2 Main Results
The model is simulated for 2,500 times and statistics summarizing the debt markets
in group h countries are reported. Table 2.2 reports the yield, the default probability,
the debt to GDP ratio, and the implied risk–free rate for three cases: the overall mean,
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when group f countries repay, when group f countries default. The yield is defined as
1/q − 1, while the implied risk-free rate is calculated by
rf =
1
E
[
δψ′(c′L)
ψ′(cL)
] − 1
Table 2.2 shows that the overall mean of yield is 5.4%, the overall mean of the default
probability is 4.5%, the overall mean of the debt to GDP ratio is 4.4%2 , and the overall
mean of the risk-free interest rate is 4%. These four statistics, however, are affected by
the default decisions in group f countries. When group f countries default, the yield
in group h countries decreases to 5.2%. This reflects the fact that default by group f
countries makes the bond issued by group h countries the only asset to save for the
future, and thus lenders would prefer to pay, in general, a higher price for the group
h bond. The better borrowing conditions encourage group h countries to repay, as the
default probability in group h countries decreases to 4.0%. Furthermore, the better
borrowing conditions also encourage group h countries to borrow more: The debt to
GDP ratio is 4.5% when group f countries default, higher than the value of 4.3% when
group f countries repay. The pattern of changes in yield can also be demonstrated by
looking into the implied risk-free rate, which decreases from 4.1% to 3.9%. That is,
when group f countries default, lenders in general would request a lower interest rate
from any other forms of borrowing.
The arguments in the previous section show that the combination of the wealth effect
and the substitution effect is not monotonic across yf values. In particular, for medium
levels of yf , the wealth effect dominates and it improves borrowing conditions in group
h countries. On the other hand, for high levels of yf , the substitution effect dominates,
which will impose a downward pressure on the group h bond price. Table 2.3 reports the
same statistics as Table 2.2 conditional on endowment realization in group f countries.
Specifically, the endowment realization in group f countries has been separated into
three categories—low: yf < 0.963; medium: 0.963 ≤ yf ≤ 1.04; and high: yf > 1.04.
Table 2.3 shows that compared to the case when group f countries have a low
endowment realization, the group h bond yield is lower when the endowment realization
in group f countries takes a medium value and it is higher when group f countries’
2 The model in this paper shares the same difficulties with quantitative default model in generating
the right magnitude of debt to GDP ratio, see, for example, [2].
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endowment realizes to be high. Furthermore, when the endowment realization in group
f countries takes a high value, the group h bond yield is at its highest level among
these three cases. That is, although a medium level of yf benefits group h countries
through the fact that the wealth effect dominates, the further increases in yf would raise
the importance of the substitution effect and finally motivate the lenders to request a
higher premium from group h countries. In this case, group h countries respond to
the worst borrowing conditions by being more likely to default: Default probability
increases from 3.9% to 5.0%. Similar to the discussions before, the changing borrowing
conditions also change the debt positions in group h countries: with the worst borrowing
conditions when group f countries have a high endowment realization, the debt to GDP
ratio is 4.1%, lower than the value of 4.6% when the wealth effect dominates. Such a
pattern of changes in group h debt yield can also be justified by looking into the risk-free
rate, which is also at its highest value when group f countries have a high endowment
realization. In particular, with a higher endowment realization in group f countries,
lenders are more heavily investing on the group f bond and are more confident about
getting payments from group f countries in the next period. As a consequence, lenders
would thus request a higher interest rate on any form of borrowings (even if they are
risk-free), given that their payoffs at the next period are expected to be higher.
Group h countries Overall Mean Group f repays Group f defaults
Yield (%) 5.4 6.0 5.2
Default Probability (%) 4.5 4.8 4.0
Debt to GDP (%) 4.4 4.3 4.5
Risk-Free Rate (%) 4.0 4.1 3.9
Table 2.2: Statistics (Default Decision)
The results in both tables show that the model in this paper is able to explain the
empirical evidence from the recent European debt crisis. In particular, the results in
Table 2.3 show that if the endowment realization in the European peripheries change
from a high value to a low value, the yield in Germany, and the United States is reduced
by 1.0% and the debt to GDP ratio in these two countries increases by 0.3%. Because
the low value of endowment realization in European peripheries makes the bond issued
by these countries more risky, lenders would like to shift toward Germany, and the
United States. In addition, results in Table 2.2 show that the presence of Germany,
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and the United States in the borrowing market also intensifies the difficulties faced by
European peripheries. Compared to the case in which these two countries default, the
yield in European peripheries is higher by 0.8%. That is, the borrowing conditions in
European peripheries are further deteriorated given the fact that international lenders
are substitution from their bonds to the bond issued by Germany, and the United States.
In summary, the results in both table match with the empirical evidence from the recent
crisis: The bond price in Germany, and the United States increases, which worsens the
difficulties faced by European peripheries.
Another interesting fact about the results in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 is that the
changes in the risk-free rate are always smaller than the changes in the yield. For ex-
ample, when yf increases from a low value to a high value, the risk-free rate increases
by 0.4%, while the increase in yield is 1.0%. Such a smaller change in risk-free interest
rate can be attributed to the group h countries’ endogenous response to an improved
borrowing condition. Notice that when calculating the risk-free interest rate, the issuer
has been assumed to always repay their debt. The non-defaultable nature makes the
supply of risk-free bond more elastic. That is, the risk-free bond issuer accommodates
lenders’ shift toward them by issuing more debt, rather than lowering the yield, and
thus would have the largest impact on the demand of bond in group f countries. How-
ever, the decrease in risk free interest rate is too small to match the decrease in debt
yields in Germany, and the United States. In my model, if group h countries respond
to the increased demand only by issuing more bond, their default risk increase dramat-
ically. Hence, the group h countries’ endogenous response is more moderate compared
to the case of risk-free bond: When facing with improved borrowing conditions, group
h countries would choose to have a combination of more debt issuance and a lower debt
yield.
Group h countries Low yf Medium yf High yf
Yield (%) 5.3 5.0 6.3
Default Probability (%) 4.3 3.9 5.0
Debt to GDP (%) 4.4 4.6 4.1
Risk-Free Rate (%) 4.0 3.9 4.4
Table 2.3: Statistics (Endowment)
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2.1.3 Bond Price Schedule
Results in both Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 demonstrate the interdependence of bond price
function across countries by examining the average statistics. In this section, I further
study how the bond price schedule in group h countries have been affected by endowment
realization in group f countries. In particular, Figure 2.1 plots the bond price schedule,
q′h, as a function of new bond issuance, b
′
h. The schedules are for a group h endowment
realization as yh = 1.04 and initial debt levels in both groups, Bh = Bf = 0.09. I
plot the bond price schedules at three different levels of endowment realization in group
f countries, yf = 0.96, yf = 1.04, and yf = 1.12. The bond price is a decreasing
function of new bond issuance, because a higher new bond issuance implies a higher
default probability in the next period, which is consistent with the theoretical discussions
before.
The bond price schedule in the case of yf = 0.96 is depicted as the solid line in
Figure 2.1. When yf changes to its unconditional mean, 1.04, the bond price schedule
shifts up (the dashed line), which implies that borrowing conditions in group h countries
improve, as a consequence of the wealth effect. Specifically, when yf increases to 1.04,
instead of defaulting, group f countries are more likely to choose to repay, but do not
pay down the debt by a large amount. As a consequence, the group f bond serves as a
complement to the group h bond, and thus lenders would be request a lower premium
from group h countries on borrowing. On the other hand, when yf increases further
be 1.12, the bond price schedule (the dotted line) becomes tighter, and it is tightest
among these three cases. In this case, further increases in yf make the group f bond
a safe asset for the lenders, and also as a good substitute for the group h bond. As
a consequence, the lenders would like to flee to group f countries, and thus imposes a
downward pressure on the group h bond price. Hence, it leaves group h countries with
the worst borrowing conditions of the three cases.
To further investigate how the bond price in group h countries varies with the
endowment realization in group f countries, Figure 2.2 plots bond price in group h
countries as a function of yf in two cases: Group f countries are in the market and
group f countries are not in the market. Similar to the Figure 2.1, I plot the bond price
in group h countries under the case of yh = 1.04, Bh = 0.09, and Bf = 0.09 if group
f countries are in the market. The new bond issuance B′h is obtained by using the
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Figure 2.1: Bond price schedule
optimal rule by group h countries. The bond price when group f countries default is
depicted as a straight line in Figure 2.1 because of the permanent market exclusion after
default in the two-periods example. In the numerical study of infinite-periods model,
defaulted countries are allowed to reenter the market with an exogenous probability.
Hence, even if group f countries are under market exclusion, the value of yf can still
affect the bond price in group h countries slightly because the strictly positive future
possibility of reentering the market, as it has been depicted as the solid line in Figure
2.2.
On the other hand, if group f countries are in the market with a debt level Bf = 0.09,
the bond price in group h countries is highly related to yf , as it has been depicted as the
dashed line in Figure 2.2. Specifically, for low values of yf , both these two curves overlap
with each other because with a low value of endowment realization, group f countries
would choose to default even if they are in the market. For intermediate values of yf , the
dashed line lie above the solid line because of the wealth effect I’ve discussed before. On
the other hand, for high values of yf , q
′
h is decreasing in yf because of the substitution
effect, which makes the dashed line lie below the solid line. By comparing the Figure 2.1
to the Figure 1.3, it is easy to see that the numerical results here are consistent with my
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previous discussions on how the combination of the wealth effect and the substitution
effect would affect the borrowing conditions in group h countries.
0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20
yf
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
Bond Price in Group h Countries
Df =0, Bf =0. 09
Df =1
Figure 2.2: Bond price in group h countries
2.1.4 A Sudden Drop
One main goal of this paper is to see how the debt yields and debt positions in both
groups countries have been affected when there is a crisis in one group. In particular,
both the debt position and the bond price in group h countries increase as a response
to a crisis happening in group f countries, and the lenders are shifting toward group h
countries. However, such a mechanism is hard to show in the full simulation because
it is difficult to disentangle the changes due to lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior from
the changes due to fluctuations in countries’ absolute fundamentals. I then consider an
experiment in which endowment realization in group f countries drops while endowment
realization in group h countries has been held constant. Specifically, both yh and yf
equal to 1.12 initially and remain unchanged for the first 50 periods. The initial debt
levels at both groups of countries are set to be 0.105. At period 50, yf is assumed to
drop to the level of 1.04 unexpectedly, and yh is held constant at 1.12.
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Figure 2.3 plots the dynamics of bond prices and bond positions in both groups. In
the initial period, given yh = yf = 1.12 and Bh = Bf = 0.105, the optimal new bond
issuance in both groups are equalized, B′h = B
′
f = 0.105. That is, given the endowment
realization in both groups, each country will simply pay the interest and maintain the
same debt level. Hence, the bond prices in both groups are equalized and have a value
of 0.932. Given endowment realizations in both group are set to be constant for the
first 50 periods, the bond positions and the bond prices in both groups are constant
and equalized for the first 50 periods. When yf decreases unexpectedly at period 50,
the spread of debt yields between these two groups increases. Specifically, with a lower
endowment realization relative to group h countries, the bond price in group f countries
declines from 0.932 to 0.914. On the other hand, the bond price in group h countries
increases from 0.932 to 0.95 because their relatively higher endowment realization, and
the lenders are shifting toward them. Both the lower endowment realization and the
lower bond price make group f countries to borrow less: The bond position in group f
countries decreases from 0.105 to 0.045. Although the endowment realization in group
h has been held constant, the higher bond price induces them to borrow more: The
bond position in group h countries increases from 0.105 to 0.12.
The results in Figure 2.3 show that the relative fundamentals, rather than absolute
fundamentals, are important to motivate lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior, and thus
are important to determine the bond prices across countries. Specifically, the decline in
yf at period 50 makes the bond issued by group h countries more appealing to the bond
issued by group f countries. Although the endowment realization in group h countries
doesn’t change, the bond price in these countries increases because international lenders
are substituting from the group f bond to the group h bond.
Another interesting aspect of Figure 2.3 is that the short-run changes in bond price
is different from the long-run changes. In particular, there is overshooting in the group
h bond price, and the group f bond price increases initially despite it declines in the
long run. This is because the sudden drop in yf would firstly be reflected in changes
in the bond prices before both groups of countries had optimally responded to it by
changing their debt positions. When yf decreases at period 50, the difference in relative
fundamentals is large and will be firstly reflected by the group h bond price. After the
group h countries increase their debt issuance, the group h bond price would drop, but
38
it is still higher than the bond price before the change. This implies that the supply
of bond in group h countries is not perfectly elastic: Group h countries accommodate
the improved borrowing conditions by issuing more debt, as can be seen from Figure
2.3, but they will not increase the debt issuance enough to exhaust all the increase
in the demand of their bond, and still leave rooms for their bond price to increase.
Furthermore, because the group h countries are accommodating the lenders’ flight-to-
quality behavior, an increase in group h bond issuance implies the group f countries
are now facing with decreased demand of their bond, which will finally drive down the
bond price in group f countries and force these countries to reduce their debt positions,
as it is shown in Figure 2.3.
The experiment here is able to explain the dynamics in debt yields and debt posi-
tions during the recent crisis. Specifically, the numerical results predict that because the
GDP in European peripheries dropped at late 2009, international lenders shifted toward
Germany, and the United States. The international lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior
left Germany, and the United States with increased demand of their bonds, while re-
duced the demand of bonds issued by European peripheries. On the other hand, these
two safer countries accommodated such a change by increasing their bond issuance,
which finally resulted at a combination of increased bond prices and debt positions in
these two countries, and, at the same time, the decreased bond prices and difficulties
in raising funds abroad in European peripheries. In this sense, the bonds issued by
Germany, and the United States served as the global safe asset for the international
lenders, which is similar to the results in [19, 20].
2.1.5 Sensitivity
The results in previous sections show that the substitution effect is quantitatively im-
portant for generating different changes in debt yields and debt positions across coun-
tries during the recent crisis. Because the flight-to-quality behavior is a consequence of
lenders’ willingness to avoid a loss, its magnitude is affected by how risk averse and how
wealthy the lenders are. In particular, the more risk averse the lenders are, or the fewer
periodic income they have, the more likely they would like to re-balance their portfolios,
when there is a difference between countries’ relative fundamentals.
In this section, I show that the above arguments are consistent with results from the
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Figure 2.3: A Sudden Drop in Group f Countries’ Endowment
numerical exercise by changing the lender’s risk aversion or periodic fixed endowment.
In this exercise, the lenders’ utility function has been changed to be CRRA,
u (cL) =
c1−γL
1− γ
I consider different values of lender’s risk aversion or periodic fixed endowment: a linear
utility function (γ = 0), a lower value of γ, a higher value of γ, or a lower value of yL.
The first four rows of Table 2.4 report results under these four variations, as well as
the benchmark model. First, the overall mean of debt yield and default probability are
increasing in the value of γ: The more risk averse the lenders are, the higher the premium
they would request from borrowing countries, which will force borrowing countries to
be more likely to default. Second, both these two statistics increase in the case of
yL = 1.0. Because the absolute risk aversion is decreasing in the level of wealth under a
CRRA utility function, a lower periodic income in this model makes the lenders charge
a higher premium in general. Furthermore, the higher yield associated with the higher
risk aversion (or the lower income) also forces borrowing countries to borrow less: The
overall mean of debt to GDP ratio drops, but the magnitude is lower than the change
in debt yield. Finally, the overall mean of risk-free interest rate remains unchanged,
because it is governed by lenders’ discount rate, δ, which also remains unchanged.
Table 2.4 also reports results that showing how changes in lenders’ risk attitude
and endowment determine how borrowing countries have been treated differently in the
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international borrowing market. First, I examine the difference in these four statistics
in group h countries between the case of a high yf and the case of a low yf . The results
are consistent with the economic intuition: The differences in all these four statistics are
bigger when the lenders either become more risk averse or have a lower periodic fixed
endowment. That is, international lenders are more likely to commit flight-to-quality
behavior when they become more risk averse. Second, I also examine the correlations
of the yield rate between these two groups of countries by separating yf into three
categories in a similar way as Table 2.3. It is easy to notice that correlations become
more diverse if lenders are more risk averse or have a lower endowment, which again
demonstrates that lenders with a higher risk aversion are more likely to shift across
borders when the relative fundamentals are different across countries.
Group h countries Benchmark Linear γ = 0.5 γ = 2 yL = 1.0
Mean
Yield (%) 5.4 4.6 4.8 7.2 5.8
Default Probability (%) 4.5 4.2 4.3 8.8 4.8
Debt to GDP (%) 4.4 5.3 5.1 4.0 4.2
Risk-Free Rate (%) 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Difference, High yf - Low yf
Yield (%) 1.0 0.0 0.3 4.6 1.2
Default Probability (%) 0.7 0.0 0.2 2.6 1.1
Debt to GDP (%) 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4
Risk-Free Rate (%) 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.5
Corr. of Yields
Low yf 0.52 -0.01 0.34 0.53 0.63
Medium yf 0.58 0.00 0.46 0.78 0.65
High yf 0.42 0.00 0.18 0.41 0.44
Table 2.4: Sensitivity Analyses
2.2 Discussion
The previous sections have demonstrated that the substitution effect is important in
inducing lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior, and finally results in different changes in
borrowing conditions across countries, which is consistent with empirical evidence from
the recent crisis. Although the numerical study is successful in matching the general
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pattern of changes in yields and debt positions in Germany, and the United States, it fails
to generate the increase in yield in European peripheries with the same magnitude. In
this paper, both groups of countries are symmetric, and thus the changes in yields would
have same magnitude. However, countries such as Germany, and the United States are
also big in their economic sizes, compared to European peripheries. As [19, 20] argue,
these countries’ bigger economic size implies that they have bigger debt capacities to
absorb capital flights from European peripheries. By taking country size into account,
I expect that the model will generate the decrease in yields in European peripheries
with the correct magnitude, because the bigger debt capacities in Germany, and the
United States would further motivate lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior. However, such
an experiment is left for future research.
Another important feature of sovereign debt crises is that they occur in tandem, e.g.,
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the recent Euro Zone Crisis, etc. Prior studies address
the question of how shocks in one country are transmitted to another country. [25]
first noticed that the contagion of sovereign debt crisis can be explained by the basic
principles of portfolio theory. [23] describe crisis contagion as a phenomenon caused
by the wealth effect: when negative shocks in one particular asset brings the investor
a loss, she tends to retrench her investment from the whole portfolio due to the lower
level of wealth. In a numerical exercise, [1] show that home country’s default probability
increases dramatically when foreign country defaults due to the wealth effect.
However, if the recent crisis in European peripheries is taken as a contagion of the
Greek crisis, it is easy to see that a crisis is not propagated to every country without
any discrimination. [26] show that investors who suffer a lost due to a crisis are more
likely to retrench their funds from countries (and thus the contagion of crisis) that share
overexposed investors with the crisis country. However, their model implies that whether
a country suffers from the crisis contagion is purely determined by lenders’ past behavior.
By inducing lenders to treat borrowing countries differently, the substitution effect (and
in turn the lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior) examined in this paper has the potential
to explain such a pattern of the crisis propagation. I will provide a case study below to
address the importance of the substitution effect in explaining why some countries suffer
from contagion during the crisis, but others don’t. In particular, the following analysis
focuses on answering the question of what characteristics contaminated countries share
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with the crisis country that makes them targets for lenders to retrench their investment.
Suppose that in addition to these two groups of countries, lenders also trade with
another country—say country z—which has been expected to always repay the debt.
Suppose country z defaults unexpectedly, which causes lenders to lose a fixed fraction
of their periodic endowment, µyL, µ ∈ (0, 1). Lenders’ lower income implies that they
would charge a higher premium in general on international lending, which shifts group
h countries’ best response functions to the right. Moreover, as it has been demonstrated
in the sensitivity analysis in section 2.1.5, the substitution effect has been intensified,
because lenders are more risk averse due to the lower level of wealth. As a consequence,
yˆ (B, yf , bh)|Df=0 shifts to the right more than yˆ (B, yf , bh)|Df=1.
Figure 2.4 plots group h’s best response functions before and after the change:
yˆ0 (B, yf , bh)|Df=0 and yˆ0 (B, yf , bh)|Df=1 are best response functions before the change,
while yˆ1 (B, yf , bh)|Df=0 and yˆ1 (B, yf , bh)|Df=1 are best response functions after the
change. Consider an output realization at point a in Figure 2.4: Group h countries don’t
default if country z doesn’t default, but they will be forced to default after country z
defaults. This is because when yL decreases, lenders are motivated to reexamine their
portfolios due to the increases in their absolute risk aversion. When the endowment
realization happens to be point a, lenders notice that that group h countries’ future
default risks are relatively high compared to group f countries’. This property of group
h bond becomes more unfavorable to the lenders under the new level of wealth, and
thus lenders would like to retrench from group h countries and increase the propor-
tion of group f bonds in their portfolios. Decreased demand will again force group h
countries to default immediately. On the other hand, group f countries have better bor-
rowing conditions, because they are experiencing capital inflows. That is, the lenders in
this model are retrenching from countries which share similar risk profiles as the crisis
country, instead of similar portfolio exposures as in [26].
The example in the last paragraph can be mapped onto the recent European debt
crisis. Specifically, after Greece defaults, international lenders with a lower level of
wealth are more sensitive to the future default risks and will reexamine the risk structure
of their portfolios. Because European peripheries have a relatively higher future default
risk compared to Germany, and the United States, they are the first group of countries
from which lenders want to withdraw their money. At the same time, the larger debt
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capacities in Germany, and the United States provide the lenders safe assets to store their
value. As a consequence, the lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior leaves other European
peripheries with the contagion of the Greek crisis, and at the same time, improved
borrowing conditions and increased debt positions in Germany, and the United States,
because they are relatively safe. Such a pattern of sovereign debt crisis contagion is
more consistent with empirical evidence from the recent crisis.
Figure 2.4: Contagion of Crisis
2.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a model of sovereign default with two groups of borrowing coun-
tries and one continuum of lenders. In the model, sovereign debt crises happens in one
group of countries, and improved borrowing conditions and increased debt positions in
the other group of countries coexist when lenders re-balance their portfolios dramati-
cally. A substitution effect arises between different bonds, because borrowing countries
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are competing with each other for international borrowing. In particular, the substitu-
tion effect indicates international lenders to reduce their bond holdings in one group of
countries if countries’ relative fundamentals are different, and the future default risks
in these countries are relatively high. When the difference between these two groups’
fundamentals is big enough, lenders’ flight-to-quality behavior is dramatic enough to
leave one group of countries with flight-to-quality debt crises, and at the same time, the
other group of countries with improved borrowing conditions and increased debt posi-
tions, because they are experiencing capital inflows. In this sense, the model is able to
explain the debt yield dynamics across countries during the recent crisis, especially the
drop in debt yield in Germany, and the United States. Furthermore, because Germany,
and the United States accommodate the lenders’ capital flight by issuing more debt,
the model also predicts that the difficulties faced by European peripheries have been
intensified. Lastly, the substitution effect emphasized in this paper predicts a crisis is
only proved to be contagious to countries which are likely to share similar problems
as the crisis country in servicing their debt. In this way, the model in this paper is
also able to explain why a crisis originating in Greece only spreads to other European
peripheries, but not to Germany, and the United States.
Chapter 3
Persistent Market Exclusion
3.1 Introduction
The sovereign debt is subjected to default because it is hard to enforce the contract
across borders. It is natural to argue that the after default punishment is necessary to
support equilibrium borrowing in sovereign debt market. Therefore, a rational lender
cares about how she should punish the defaulted borrower at the moment of lending
money out. The main question in this paper is given the borrower’s endowment is
persistent, what is the optimal duration of market exclusion the international lender
should choose?
In this paper, I analyze a case under which a lender trades repeatedly with a sovereign
country. The sovereign country’s endowment process is persistent and it is private
information to the country itself. Different from traditional studies under which the
duration of market exclusion has been set to be exogenous1 , in this paper, the after
default punishment is also part of the contract design. In specific, the lender decides
on recovery ratio such that the borrower should repay the debt recovery specified to
reenter the market (or at least to avoid the output cost). The borrower with a bad
credit standing, on the other hand, decides on whether to repay the debt recovery to
reenter the market and escape from the output cost due to market exclusion. By doing
so, the model in this paper synthesize the choice of the duration of market exclusion
with the problem of what is the recovery ratio on defaulted debt.
1 See for example, [4], [12], [6], etc.
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The lender in this paper offers to the borrower a recovery plan which is decreasing
over time. Consequently, the borrower who defaulted but has a relatively high endow-
ment realization would prefer to repay in short periods after default. On the other
hand, the borrower who has a low endowment realization cannot afford a high recovery,
thus she would choose to stay with the market exclusion (and so as the output cost) in
order to get a higher haircut. In other words, the lender in this paper is using time to
separate the borrower’s states. Such a result is also consistent with [3] where they find
the haircut on defaulted debt is increasing in the duration of market exclusion.
The fact that the borrower’s endowment process is private information prevents the
lender from making debt repayment fully contingent on the borrower’s states. Instead,
the lender chooses a optimal plan to elicit the highest expected value of repayments
from the borrower. A harsher plan is beneficial to the lender because it brings higher
repayments when the borrower repays for market reentry ex post, and it also discourages
the borrower from defaulting ex ante by making the after default value lower. However,
it doesn’t mean that the lender should choose not to permit any haircuts on defaulted
debt. A harsher plan also makes the duration of market exclusion too lengthy such that
it is also non-optimal for the lender to keep it. Therefore, it is optimal for the lender to
choose a plan with positive haircuts, as in [27].
The lender in this paper provides a recovery plan that features decreasing recovery
ratios over time, which distinguishes this study from the invariant recovery results under
an i.i.d. setting in [27]. To understand why, let’s think about a case that a defaulted
borrower’s endowment can take two possible values, low and high. Given the lender will
grant a haircut on the defaulted debt, it is more efficient for the lender to allocate the
haircut to the borrower with a low endowment. However, as the borrower’s endowment
is unobservable, the borrower with a high endowment would like to pretend to be a low
type. To make such a plan feasible, it requires the low type borrower to stay with the
market exclusion longer in general. Such an arrangement is efficient also in the sense
that the output cost under market exclusion is lower (and thus more bearable) for the
low type borrower. In equilibrium, the high type borrower will pay more but enter the
market earlier while the low type borrower should wait longer in order to pay less. In
this sense, a decreasing recovery ratio enables lender to partially make debt repayment
contingent on the borrower’s endowment realization. By doing so, the lender’s optimal
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plan on recovery ratio separates the borrower’s states by using time.
The reason why the lender can choose such a plan is because the borrower’s endow-
ment process is persistent in this paper. A borrower refuses to repay the debt recovery
signals to the lender a low current endowment realization. Because the endowment
process is persistent, it also signals a low endowment in the future. Since the borrower
refused to repay the debt recovery, the lender should provide a lower recovery to bring
the borrower back to the market. In contrast, if the borrower’s endowment process is
i.i.d., as in [27], there is no longer any linkages between borrower’s endowments across
periods. Specifically, a low current period endowment realization doesn’t necessary im-
ply a low endowment realization in the future. As a consequence, the lender decides
the recovery ratio solely based on the invariant endowment distribution, and thus the
recovery ratio should be time invariant. Therefore, the model in this paper is able to
explain the empirical findings in [3], where they found the haircut on defaulted debt is
increasing in the duration of market exclusion.
This work builds on the model of efficient sovereign default analyzed by [27] and [28].
The models presented in these papers focus on contracting problem of sovereign default
in the case of an i.i.d. endowment process. They show that despite the market exclusion
is inefficiency in an ex post sense, it is necessary to support the ex ante efficiency so
that sovereign debt borrowings can be sustainable. However, because the endowment
process is i.i.d., the lender’s way of choosing the inefficiency is invariant over time. That
is, the recovery on defaulted debt is time invariant in their paper. This paper consider
a similar problem with the lender’s endowment process to be persistent. Different from
previous studies based on i.i.d. settings, the lender in this paper no longer chooses a
time invariant recovery ratio. Instead, the lender in this paper chooses a recovery plan
which features a decreasing recovery ratio over time.
Another branch of sovereign debt literature examines empirical evidence regarding
sovereign default and debt renegotiation, such as [29, 30], [31] and [3]. In particular,
by constructing a complete database of default and debt restructurings from 1970 until
2010, [3] document that the haircut on defaulted debt is increasing in the duration of
market exclusion. They also show that the probability of market reentry is increasing
over time after the default. However, they tend to explain the empirical results in a
way that the lender chooses a longer market exclusion to punish the borrower requests
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a higher haircut. In contrast, a higher haircut in this paper is not the direct cause of
a higher market exclusion. In fact, the lender chooses them together to separate the
borrower’s states. Because in equilibrium, the recovery ratio is decreasing over time, the
model in this paper can generate similar results that the probability of market reentry
is increasing over time after default.
More generally, this paper also contributes to sovereign debt literature on debt
restructuring since the lender takes market exclusion as an apparatus to persuade debt
repayments. The existing studies model the debt restructuring as a bargaining game,
ultimately concluding that the lengthy debt restructuring is a result of the lender’s
eagerness to get a higher recovery rate on defaulted debt. For instance, studies like
[32] and [33] attribute the delay in debt restructuring to be a consequence of both
parties are waiting for a better borrower’s economic perspective and thus a bigger pie
to split. On the other hand, some other authors look into the holdout problem in
debt restructuring, see for example, [34] and [35]. Because the defaulted borrower is
bargaining with a bunch of international lenders, and because any single lender can veto
the whole debt restructuring plan, the lenders in these papers is seeking for last move
advantage. Therefore, equilibrium holdouts by international lenders emerges. However,
these papers predicts that a longer market exclusion should be associated with a lower
haircut due the last move advantage, which contradicts to the empirical findings in
[3]. In this paper, besides the static gains from resuming trade after default, the lender
chooses the debt restructuring plan also to deliver dynamic incentives. In particular, the
lender chooses a decreasing debt recovery over time so that she can bring the borrower
back to the market by orders, according to the borrower’s endowment realization. By
doing, the lender is efficiently exploit the efficiency in choosing the debt restructuring
plan.
The model in this paper is related to the classical studies on contracting the literature
on contracting problems with private information, such as [36], [37, 38], etc. Similar
to previous studies, the lender in this paper cannot observe the borrower’s endowment
state, which prevent her from making the debt recovery contingent on any observable
information regarding the borrower’s state. Instead, the lender relies on provide a plan
which is incentive compatible for the borrower to reveal her own states to the lender.
Specifically, because the plan offered by the lender has combination of market exclusions
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and recovery ratios, a defaulted borrower would choose a combination of both which is
best for her endowment realization.
Lastly, the model in this paper is also related to a recent wave of literature has
examined the optimal contracting problem in dynamic environments where agents have
private information that is persistent, see for example, [39], [40] and [41]. They show
that the agent’s consumption may grow over time under such an environment. The
model in this paper generates similar results in the sense that the debt recovery offered
to the defaulted borrower is decreasing over time. Similar to previous studies, such a
result is due to the fact that the borrower’s state is persistent, so that the lender would
like to allocate the inefficiency in an efficient way.
3.2 The Model
There are two agents in the model, the borrower and the lender, each of them lives and
trades for infinite periods. The borrower has a lifetime preference as
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct)
]
where ct is consumption. The utility function u (·) is continuous, strictly increasing and
strictly concave. At the beginning of each period t, the borrower receives her output
endowment, yt ∈ Y =
{
y1, y2, . . . , yN
}
with y1 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ yN which follows a Markov
transition function f (yt| yt−1). I also assume that the borrower’s endowment realization
is private information.
The risk neutral foreign lender has a lifetime preference as
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
δtcLt
]
The lender cannot observe the yt and she receives a fixed amount of endowment yL each
period. I assume that yL is sufficiently large in a sense that the lender is with a deep
pocket. Moreover, I assume that 0 < β < δ < 1 to guarantee equilibrium borrowings.
I assume incomplete market in the international borrowing market, that is, the
borrower can only trade with the lender on one period uncontingent bond with default
options. At period t, bt is the initial debt level and it is common knowledge to the lender
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and the borrower. With bt and the output realization yt, the borrower can choose to
repay or default on the debt. If the borrower chooses to repay the debt, she can thus
continue borrowing at the price of qt+1 by choosing bt+1. On the other hand, if the
borrower chooses to suspend the repayment (in other words, default), she will consume
the endowment (suffering an output cost) and enter the debt restructuring process. I
denote the default decision as dt
dt =
1 default0 repay
By following Arellano (2008), the defaulted borrower’s endowment changes to be ydt
immediately
ydt =
(1− λ)E (yt) yt ≥ (1− λ)E (yt)yt yt < (1− λ)E (yt) , λ ∈ (0, 1)
Instead of assuming a prescribed length of market exclusion after default, I assume
that the lender has to choose recovery ratios on the debt after default, Υt = {γt+i}∞i=1
with γt+i ∈ [0, 1] , ∀i such that if the borrower default on bt at time t, then it incurs
to her the output cost immediately at period t while at period t+ i, she can choose to
repay γt+ibt to regain the market access right at that period or stay with the market
exclusion and wait for the next period.
The timing of the sequential game between the borrower and the lender is as follows:
1. The lender sets ratio, Υt = {γt+i}∞i=1 such that if the borrower defaults at period
t, she has to repay γt+ibt for market reentry at period t+ i for market reentry.
2. yt is realized and privately observed by the borrower
3. The borrower picks a policy pit = (dt, bt+1) that consists of a default rule dt and
new borrowing bt+1
4. Bond price qt+1 is consistent with the lender’s optimality.
To define the problem formally, let the public history to be st =
(
st−1, Υt, pit
)
, ∀t and
s−1 = (b0) be the initial outstanding debt. It is convenient to define the following
public histories when agents take action: stγ = s
t−1, stpi =
(
st−1, Υt
)
. The strategy for
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the borrower, {pit}∞t=0 and the price of bonds {qt+1}∞t=0 are all functions of the relevant
histories. Notice that if the borrower default at period t, and if she decides not to repay
at period t+ 1, then
Υt+1 = Υt/γt+1
That is, the recovery ratios chose at period t will be inherited at period t + 1 if the
borrower defaulted at time t and refuses to repay for market reentry at period t+ 1. A
similar result is applicable at period t+ 2 if the borrower continues to refuse to repay.
To formulate the borrower’s problem, I firstly defined the problem confronted to a
borrower at time t+ i who defaulted at time t, W
(
st+i
∣∣
bt+i=γt+ibi , yt+i
)
as:
W
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+i=bt , yt+i
)
= max
dt+i
{
(1− dt+i)W r
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+i=bt , yt+i
)
+dt+iW
nr
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+i=bt , yt+i
) }
where
Wnd
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+i=bt , yt+i
)
=
u (yt+i + qt+1bt+i+1 − γt+ibt) +
β
∑
yt+i+1∈Y V
(
st+i+1pi , yt+i+1
)
f (yt+i+1| yt+i)
W d
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+i=bt , yt+i
)
=
u
(
ydt+i
)
+
β
∑
yt+i+1∈Y W
(
st+i+1pi
∣∣
bt+i+1=bt , yt+i+1
)
f (yt+i+1| yt+i)
Here, I abuse the notation of dt such that
dt+i =
1 refuse to repay0 repay
and thus
dt+i =
1 Wnd
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+i=bt , yt+i
)
< W d
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+i=bt , yt+i
)
0 Wnd
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+i=bt , yt+i
) ≥W d (st+ipi ∣∣bt+i=bt , yt+i)
I then define the borrower’s problem given that she has a good credit standing at
period t. Taking as given the price schedule, qt+1, after any history
(
stpi, yt
)
, the strategy
for the borrower, pit, solves the following problem:
V
(
stpi, yt
)
= max
dt
{
(1− dt)V nd
(
stpi, yt
)
+ dtV
d
(
stpi, yt
)}
(3.1)
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where
V nd
(
stpi, yt
)
= max
bt+1
u (yt + qt+1bt+1 − bt) + β ∑
yt+1∈Y
V
(
st+1pi , yt+1
)
f (yt+1| yt)

V d
(
stpi, yt
)
= u
(
ydt
)
+ β
∑
yt+1∈Y
W
(
st+ipi
∣∣
bt+1=bt , yt+1
)
f (yt+1| yt)
We define dt as
dt =
1 V nd
(
stpi, yt
)
< V d
(
stpi, yt
)
0 V nd
(
stpi, yt
) ≥ V d (stpi, yt)
The lender’s problem is to choose Υt such that it maximizes the expected value of
the debt repayment from the borrower. Thus, the lender’s value can be defined as:
VL
(
stγ
)
= max
Υt
E
{[
1− d (st, yt)]V ndL (stpi, yt)+ d (stpi, yt)V dL (stpi, yt)} (3.2)
where
V ndL
(
stpi, yt
)
= max
bt+1
{
yL + bt − qt+1bt+1 + δVL
(
st+1γ
)}
V dL
(
stpi, yt
)
= yL + δVL
(
st+1γ |bt+1 = bt
)
3.2.1 Equilibrium
I focus on a recursive Markov equilibrium in which all decision rules are solely the
functions of state variables (s, bh).
Definition 3.1. A recursive Markov equilibrium for this economy consists of (i) the bor-
rower’s policy functions for repayment, borrowing, and consumption, d (spi, y), b
′ (spi, y),
and c (spi, y), and values V (spi, y), V
nd (spi, y), V
d (spi, y), W (spi, y), W
nd (spi, y), and
W d (spi, y); (ii) lenders’ policy functions for lending choices, recovery plan, and con-
sumption b˜′ (sγ), Υ (sγ), and cL (sγ), and value function VL (sγ); (iii) the functions for
bond price q
(
s, b′j
)
; (v) the evolution of the aggregate state H (s) such that, given that
the initial debt levels are the same across countries within each group and bj,0 = b˜j,0,∀j:
1. Taking as given the bond price, the evolution of the aggregate state H (s), the
evolution of default ratio D (s), and the evolution of average new bond issuance
B (s), the policy and value functions for the borrower solve her problem in equation
(3.1).
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2. Taking as given the bond prices q
(
s, b′j
)
and evolution of the aggregate states
H (s), the policy functions and value functions for the lenders b˜′ (sγ), Υ (sγ), and
cL (sγ) solve the lender’s problem in equation (3.2).
3. The prices of debt q
(
s, b′j
)
clear the bond market for every country, b′ (spi, y) =
b˜′ (sγ).
4. The goods market clears, c+ cL = y + yL.
5. The law of motions for the evolution aggregate states s′ = H (s) is consistent with
the borrower and the lender’s decision rules and shocks.
3.3 A Three-Periods Example
In this section, I will use a three-periods example to illustrate the main mechanism
behind. There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. The borrower’s lifetime preference is
E
[
u (c0) + βu (c1) + β
2u (c2)
]
The borrower’s endowment is stochastic in period 0, and it is unobservable to the lender2
. The borrower’s endowment state space in period 0 is {yh, yl} with yh > yl > 0. For
simplicity, assume that Pr (yh) = Pr (yl) = 0.5. In other words, the borrower has
two types, high and low, with equal probability. The borrower’s endowment is further
assumed to be fixed at all three periods. That is, I am considering an extreme case of
persistence that the borrower’s endowment is fixed once it has realized. Furthermore,
assume that the initial debt level at period 0, b0 is big enough such that at period 0 the
borrower would choose to default at both states3 . There is a fractional output cost
after default
ydt = (1− λ) yt, λ ∈ (0, 1) , t = 1, 2, 3
2 So that the repayment plan proposed by the lender cannot be contingent on the borrower’s
endowment realization.
3 This may seem weird because the borrower cannot borrow up to b0 ex ante given she will default
at any states ex post. However, it is designed for simplicity, imagine that there are actually three states,
{yH , yh, yl} such that yH > yh > yl, and the borrower would choose to repay if y0 = yH . By omitting
yH , I would be able to ignore the problem of how the optimal plan relates to the borrower’s repayment
incentive at period 0, as welll as the borrower’s problem of rollover the debt once she chooses to repay
at period 0. Or in other words, I focus on ex post aspect of the lender’s optimal recovery plan.
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The risk neutral foreign lender has a lifetime preference as
E
[
cL0 + δc
L
1 + δ
2cL2
]
The lender receives a fixed amount of endowment yL each period, and I assume that
yL is sufficiently large
4 . The problem confronted to the lender is to choose {γ1, γ2} in
period 0 to maximize the expected value of repayment by the borrower.
To facilitate future analysis, I firstly focus on the case where the lender can (presum-
ably) observe the borrower’s endowment. Because of the time horizon is limited, the
lender’s plan can be derived by backward inductions. If the high type borrower didn’t
repay at period 1, the lender would choose γh2 = λyh/b0 to make the borrower indifferent
between repayment and stay with market exclusion in period 2. I further assume that,
if the borrower choose to repay in period 1, then she will rollover the biggest amount
of debt into period 2, which is λyh
5 . Then in period 1, the incentive compatibility
requires
u
(
yh − γh1 b0 + δλyh
)
+ βu (yh − λyh) ≥ (1 + β)u (yh − λyh)
Because u (·) is strictly increasing, the equation above imposes a upper limit on the
γh1 that the lender can choose. Since the lender would like to extract the highest debt
repayment from the borrower, she would choose γh1 such that the equation above holds
in equality. Thus, the plan for the type h borrower is
γh1 =
(1 + δ)λyh
b0
, γh2 =
λyh
b0
Similarly, in case of y0 = yl, the lender would choose
γl1 =
(1 + δ)λyh
b0
, γl2 =
λyh
b0
Because yh > yl, thus
γh1 > γ
l
1, γ
h
2 > γ
l
2
Under such a plan, both types of borrower would choose to repay in period 1.
4 Or the lender can be assumed to be able to borrower and lend at an interest rate of 1/δ−1, either
one can insure that the lender has a deep pocket.
5 This can be guaranteed if β is sufficiently small, or b0 is sufficiently big, either of these two is
innocuous for my example here.
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Back to the case when the borrower’s endowment is unobservable and if the lender
would like to bunch the borrower’s states, then she would choose a plan {γˆ1, γˆ2} such
that γˆ1 = (1 + δ)λyl/b0 and γˆ2 = λyl/b0. A natural doubt is why the lender would
choose such a plan if she want to bunch the borrower’s states? The reason is because
if the lender choose γˆ1 = (1 + δ)λyl/b0 and γˆ2 > λyl/b0, then both the borrower’s
repayment choice and the lender’s expected value will be the same. However, if the
lender chooses γˆ1 > (1 + δ)λyl/b0 and γˆ2 = λyl/b0 , then only the type h borrower is
possible to repay in period 1, which is no longer bunching. Finally, if the lender chooses
γˆ1 > (1 + δ)λyl/b0 and γˆ2 > λyl/b0 then type l borrower would never find it optimal
to repay in both periods, again, no longer bunching. Under such a plan, both types
borrowers choose to repay (1 + δ)λyl unambiguously in period 1 to reenter the market.
Thus, the lender’s expected value of repayment under this plan is plan is denoted as VˆL
VˆL = (1 + δ)λyl
If the lender would like to separate the borrower’s states, then one extreme option
for her is to abandon type l borrower’s repayment by choosing {γ˜1, γ˜2} such that γ˜1 =
(1 + δ)λyh/b0 and γ˜2 = λyh/b0. Under such a plan, only type h borrower would repay
in period 1 while type l borrower would choose to stay with market exclusion forever.
The lender’s expected value of repayment is denoted as V˜L
V˜L =
(1 + δ)λyh
2
Notice that under {γˆ1, γˆ2}, I have6
u (yh − γˆ1b0 + δλyh) + βu (yh − λyh) ≥ u (yh − λyh) + βu (yh − λyl)
To make the lender’s problem meaningful, I further assume that the equation above is
slacked, which leaves rooms for the lender to separate the borrower’s states by choosing
{γ1, γ2}. Specifically, let γ∗1 denote the value such that
u (yh − γ∗1b0 + δλyh) + βu (yh − λyh) = u (yh − λyh) + βu (yh − λyl) (3.3)
6 Otherwise the lender’s expected value would be (1+2δ)λyl
2
, and the problem becomes trivial because
the lender’s problem is only to decide which one among {γˆ1, γˆ2} and {γ˜1, γ˜2} is associated with a higher
expected value.
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Because u (·) is strictly increasing, the equation above implies that γh1 > γ∗1 > γl1. Thus,
if the lender choose a plan {γ¯1, γ¯2} such that γ¯1 = γ∗1 and γ¯2 = λyl/b0, then type h
borrower would like to repay in period 1 while type l borrower would like to repay in
period 2. The expected value of repayment under a plan is denoted as V¯L
V¯L =
γ∗1b0 + δλyl
2
In the followings, I will show that {γ¯1, γ¯2} is the lender’s optimal plan under certain
circumstance. Furthermore, under such a plan, the type h borrower repays in period 1
while type l borrower repays in period 2. In other words, the lender is using time to
separate the borrower’s states.
Proposition 3.1. If yl <
1+δ
1+2δyh, then there exists a value β¯ ∈ [0, δ) such that the
lender strictly prefers {γ¯1, γ¯2} to {γˆ1, γˆ2} and {γ˜1, γ˜2} if β < β¯. Under such a plan, the
type h borrower would choose to repay γ¯1b0 in period 1 while the type l borrower would
choose to repay γ¯2b0 = λyl in period 2, and γ¯1b0 > γ¯2b0. In equilibrium, {γ¯1, γ¯2} is also
the lender’s optimal plan, where γ¯1 > γ¯2.
Proof. By equation (3.3)
u (yh − γ∗1b0 + δλyh) + βu (yh − λyh) = u (yh − λyh) + βu (yh − λyl)
⇒
u (yh − γ∗1b0 + δλyh) = u (yh − λyh) + β [u (yh − λyl)− u (yh − λyh)]
Since u (·) is strictly continuous and strictly increasing, γ∗ is strictly decreasing in β.
Therefore, V¯L is strictly decreasing in β. Furthermore, from equation (3.3), it is easy
to find that γ∗1 → (1+δ)λyhb0 as β → 0, and thus γ1 →
(1+δ)λyh
b0
as β → 0. As a
consequence, V¯L → (1+δ)λyh+λyl2 as β → 0, which is unambiguously greater than V˜L.
Since yl <
1+δ
1+2δyh, it is also greater than VˆL. Therefore, there exists a value β¯ ∈ [0, δ)
such that the lender strictly prefers {γ¯1, γ¯2} to {γˆ1, γˆ2} and {γ˜1, γ˜2} if β < β¯. The
equation (3.3) also implies type h consumer would choose to repay in period 1. On the
other hand, because γ¯1 > γ
l
1, γ¯2 = γ
l
2 , type l borrower would prefer to repay in period 2.
Finally, because type h borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint holds in equality
in this case so that the lender cannot increase γ¯1 to extract more repayments from type
h borrower. On the other hand, because type l borrower would only like to repay in
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period 1 if γ1 = γ
l
1, which makes the lender’s expected value equal to V˜L and has been
proved to be lower than V¯L if β < β¯. Therefore, {γ¯1, γ¯2} is the lender’s optimal plan on
debt recovery. Because γ∗1 > γl1 and γl1 > γl2, so we also have γ¯1 > γ¯2
The Proposition 3.1 describes an equilibrium such that the high type borrower would
repay γ¯1b0 in period 1 while the low type borrower would wait until period 2 to repay
γ¯2b0. The fact that γ¯1 > γ¯2 implies that the high type borrower is paying more than
the low type borrower for the early market access. In essential, the lender is separating
the borrower’s states by using time. Such a result is consistent with the empirical
findings in [3] that the haircut on debt is increasing in the duration of market exclusion.
Moreover, because the recovery plan offered to the borrower is decreasing over time. The
results in this example are also consistent with the literature on optimal contracts on
persistent private information, such as [39], [40] and [41], which found that the agent’s
consumption is increasing over time.
By assuming the borrower to default unambiguously in both states, the example
here is in essential about the lender’s ex post optimality in choosing the recovery plan.
As [27] argued, as an ex post inefficiency, equilibrium market exclusion after default is
necessary to support the ex ante efficiency. However, such an ignorance of the lender’s
ex ante optimality in this example is innocuous. In essential, the example here shows
that even if the market exclusion after default is inefficient ex post, it is the lender’s
interest to to deliver the inefficiencies in an efficient way. In particular, the market
exclusion is even more inefficient for the high type borrower because she can afford a
higher debt recovery. Therefore, the example features an equilibrium under which the
high type borrower repays a higher recovery to reenter the market earlier. Reciprocally,
because the low type borrower can afford only a lower amount of debt recovery, it is
efficient for her to wait longer, which also delivery incentives for the high type borrower
to pay more.
The condition of yl <
1+δ
1+2δyh states that if the borrower’s states are too close to
each other, bunching the states is more profitable for the lender. Similar assumptions
can be found in previous studies, e.g., [27]. On the other hand, a low value of β implies
the borrower care more about period 1 output cost than the lower debt repayment in
period 2. Thus, a type h borrower would like to repay more than (1 + δ)λyl to avoid the
output cost in period 1, which again, enables the lender to separate the states. Notice
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that both these two conditions also interact with each other. In particular, the value of
β¯ is affected by the difference between of yh and yl.
In the following, I will do a simple numerical exercise to demonstrate previous ar-
guments. Specifically, the borrower’s utility function is natural logarithm, u (c) = ln c.
I assume that yh = 4.0, b0 = 2.0, λ = 0.1 and δ = 0.95. The benchmark setting has yl
equal to 2.24, and figure 3.1 shows how V¯L changes in the value of β, as well as how
it compares to the values of VˆL and V˜L. It justifies my previous argument that given
yl <
1+δ
1+2δyh, there exists a β¯ such that {γ¯1, γ¯2} strictly dominates {γˆ1, γˆ2} and {γ˜1, γ˜2}
if β < β¯, where β ' 0.7 in this example.
I then analyze how the value of β¯ changes in the value of yl, or in essentially, the
gap between yh and yl. Figure 3.2 shows a similar graph by considering the case of
yl = 2. The fact that yh = 2yl implies VˆL = V˜L. By comparing figure 3.2 to figure 3.1,
it is easy to notice that when yh > 2yl, the value of β¯ is increasing in the difference
between yh and yl. In particular, when yh = 2yl, β¯ = δ. That is, {γ¯1, γ¯2} is the lender’s
optimal plan under any values of β. As I’ve argued before, the reason is because a
larger difference between yh and yl leaves more rooms for the lender to separate the
borrower’s states. However, such an argument is not always true, figure 3.3 shows that
a similar graph when yl = 1.78. Instead of becoming larger, the result in this figure
shows that the value of β¯ is decreasing in yl when yh > 2yl. Despite the lender chooses
γ¯2 = λyl/b0 in order to extract debt repayment from type l in period 2, it also forces her
to choose γ¯1 instead of γ˜1 because otherwise the type h borrower would find it optimal
to repay in period 2. When the value of yl becomes low enough, the benefits of extract
debt repayment from the type l borrower is dominated by the benefit to extract more
repayment from type h borrower in period 1, and thus makes the value of β¯ lower.
One drawback of the numerical analysis above is the value of β¯ is sensitive on the
value of yl. For example, β¯ equals to 0.7 in the benchmark case where yl = 2.24, but it
equals to 0.95 when yl = 2. A value of β lower than 0.7 is too small compared to the
typical lender’s discount rate in international business cycle studies, see for example,
[6]. One caveat for such a result is the example considered here has only three periods.
In particular, a borrower cannot rollover part of the debt recovery into future if a plan
encourages her to repay in period 2, which in turn limits the amount of debt recovery.
In contrast, if a plan makes borrower to repay in period 1, the fact that she can rollover
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Figure 3.1: The Lender’s Value, yl = 2.24
the debt implies a higher debt recovery in period 1. As a consequence, in addition to
the lender’s discounting, the big difference between net repayments from the low type
borrower in both periods also encourages the lender to adopt a plan that features debt
repayments for both types of borrowers. In order to make it profitable for the lender
to separate the borrower’s states, such an incentive should overcome by some other
benefits. In particular, to compensate the lender for letting the low type borrower to
repay in period 2, debt repayment from the high type borrower should be high enough,
which can only be supported if β is sufficiently small7 .
On the other hand, if the number of periods of the example above is extended (or
finally goes to infinity), the problem of β¯ being too low will be alleviated (or finally
eliminated). In this case, there is no longer a large difference in debt repayments across
different periods due to the lack of rollover apparatus. Thus, the lender’s incentive to
separate states is mostly (or purely) driven by the fact that the borrower with a lower
endowment cannot afford a high recovery, and thus it is profitable for her to wait for
7 Otherwise the high type borrower would like to pretend to be a low type so that she can wait for
a lower debt repayment in period 2.
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Figure 3.2: The Lender’s Value, yl = 2
the future. For example, in the three-periods example above, if the low type borrower
is allowed to rollover part of debt in period 2 like the high type borrower will do in
period 1, then she will choose to repay (1 + δ)λyl instead of λyl. The fact that the
lender can elicit a higher debt repayment from the low type borrower reduces the high
type borrower’s value of deviation. In other words, the high type borrower’s incentive
constraint is relaxed so that γ∗ becomes higher given the value of β. The higher γ∗
implies that it becomes more appealing for the lender to separate the borrower’s states.
Reciprocally, as the number of periods has been increased, higher values of β can be
supported that the lender strictly prefers {γ¯1, γ¯2}.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a model of optimal debt contracting between a borrower and a
lender who trade in multiple periods. In the model, the borrower’s endowment is private
information that is persistent. By choosing an optimal recovery plan, the lender leaves
the decision of reentering the market to the borrower. Unlike the efficient sovereign
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Figure 3.3: The Lender’s Value, yl = 1.78
default studies based on i.i.d. endowment process, the debt recovery offered by the
lender in this paper is decreasing over time. As a consequence, a borrower with a low
endowment realization would choose stay with the market exclusion longer in order to
get a higher haircut on her debt. On the other hand, due to the higher output cost on
default, a borrower with a high endowment would choose to repay a higher recovery to
reenter the market earlier. The equilibrium result shows that the recovery on defaulted
debt is thus decreasing in the duration of market exclusion, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence regarding debt restructuring in recent studies. Such a plan is result
from the fact that the lender is allocating the ex post inefficiency in an efficient way.
Specifically, in order to support the equilibrium borrowing contract, the lender has to
exclude the borrower for several periods after default. However, the lender would like
to exercise the market exclusion on the type borrower for whom it is more bearable. In
particular, because the borrower with a low endowment will suffer less output cost, it
is efficient for the lender to keep her for a longer market exclusion (but with the benefit
of a higher haircut). By doing so, the lender is in essentially using time to separate the
borrower’s states. The reason why such a plan is sustainable in this paper is because
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the borrower’s endowment is persistent in this paper. Therefore, a default (or refuse
to repay the debt recovery) by the borrower signals to the lender low endowments in
both current and future periods. Once there is a linkage between endowments across
different periods, it is optimal for the lender to reduce the debt recovery over time.
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Appendix A
Proof and Algorithm
A.1 Proof
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
Proof. The country chooses to repay only if
V nd (s, bh) ≥ V d (s)
which is
V nd (s, bh)− V d (s) ≥ 0
The value of repay and default, V nd (s, bh) and V
d (s) implies
V nd (s, bh)− V d (s) = u
(
yh + q
′
hb
′
h − bh
)
+ βu
(
yh − b′h
)− (1 + β)u(ydh)
= u
(
yh + q
′
hb
′
h − bh
)− u(ydh)
where the second equality use the property of b′h = yh − ydh.
Consider firstly the case of yh ≤ (1− λ)E (yh), then the definition of ydh implies
b′h = 0 and yh = y
d
h, thus
V nd (s, bh)− V d (s) = u (yh − bh)− u
(
ydh
)
< 0
if bh > 0. That is, the country repays the debt only if the default output cost is strictly
positive, yh > (1− λ)E (yh). Therefore, I can focus on values of yh which are greater
than (1− λ)E (yh).
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By definition, u
(
ydh
)
is constant for values of yh > (1− λ)E (yh). Notice that
q′hb
′
h is increasing in b
′
h because otherwise the country can improve both periods’ con-
sumptions by issuing less debt. On the other hand, b′h is strictly increasing in yh if
yh > (1− λ)E (yh). Because u (·) is strictly increasing, the arguments above implies
implies that u (yh + q
′
hb
′
h − bh) is strictly increasing in yh. Hence, V nd (s, bh)−V d (s, bh)
is strictly increasing in yh. Therefore, there exists a cutoff function on yh, yˆ (B, yf , bh)
such that the country repays if yh ≥ yˆ (B, yf , bh)and defaults otherwise.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof. Consider a period 1 endowment realization, yˆh ∈
[
y, y
]
such that
u
(
yˆh + qˆ
′
hbˆ
′
h − bh
)
+ βu
(
yˆh − bˆ′h
)
= (1 + β)u
(
yˆdh
)
(A.1)
where bˆ′h is the borrowing limit under yˆh such that bˆ
′
h = yˆh− yˆdh and qˆ′h is the associated
bond price. That is, yˆh is the lowest endowment realization such that countries would
choose to repay. The definition of bˆ′h implies
u
(
yˆh − bˆ′h
)
= u
(
yˆdh
)
Hence, equation (A.1) changes to be
u
(
yˆh + qˆ
′
hbˆ
′
h − bh
)
= u
(
yˆdh
)
Because u (·) is strictly increasing, the equation above implies
bh − qˆ′hbˆ′h = yˆh − yˆdh = bˆ′h
That is, with an endowment equals yˆh, countries would choose to repay, and equally
spread the burden of debt repayments into both periods.
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 1.3
Proof. Consider two possible endowment realizations, yˆh and y˜h such that yˆh, y˜h ∈
[
y, y
]
and yˆh > y˜h. Furthermore, both yˆh and yˆh are large enough such that countries strictly
prefer to repay their debt in period 1 under both two endowment realizations. Let bˆ′h
and b˜′h be the associated period 1 new bond issuance such that
bˆ′h = yˆh − yˆdh, b˜′h = y˜h − y˜dh
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The property of ydh implies that yh − ydh is strictly increasing in yh, and thus
bˆ′h > b˜
′
h
That is, with a higher endowment realization in period 1, countries borrow more due to
the fact that the borrowing limit is strictly increasing in period 1 endowment realization.
Furthermore, q′hb
′
h is strictly increasing in b
′
h because otherwise countries can get a higher
net resource transfer from the lenders by issuing less debt. Hence,
qˆ′hbˆ
′
h > q˜
′
hb˜
′
h
which implies
bh − qˆ′hbˆ′h < bh − q˜′hb˜′h
A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 1.4
Proof. Lemma 1.2 predicts that net repayments in both periods are equalized when
countries are indifferent between repay and default. On the other hand, Lemma 1.3
predicts that period 1 net repayment is strictly decreasing, while period 2 net repayment
is strictly increasing in the endowment realization. Therefore, when countries strictly
prefer to repay in period 1, the net repayment in period 2 is strictly higher than the net
repayment in period 1
b′h > bh − q′hb′h
Also, it is easy to see that the difference between these two periods’ net repayments,
(1 + q′h) b
′
h − bh is strictly increasing in yh.
A.1.5 Proof of Lemma 1.5
Proof. Consider an endowment realization in group f countries, yˆf such that these
countries are indifferent between repay and default. Let bˆ′f and qˆ
′
f be the associated
new bond issuance in these countries, Lemma 1.2 implies that net repayments by group
f countries are the same in both periods
bf − qˆ′f bˆ′f = yˆf − yˆdf = bˆ′f > 0
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if bf > 0. In this case, the bond price in group h countries is
qˆ′h =
δψ′
(
yL + b
′
h + bˆ
′
f
)
ψ′
(
yL + bh − qˆ′hb′h + bf − qˆ′f bˆ′f
) (A.2)
Consider another endowment realization in group f countries, y˜f such that y˜f < yˆf ,
the definition of yˆf implies that group f countries default under y˜f , and thus the bond
price in group h countries is
q˜′h =
δψ′ (yL + b′h)
ψ′
(
yL + bh − q˜′hb′h
) (A.3)
which is independent of y˜f .
To compare qˆ′h and q˜
′
h, I have to take into account the borrowing behavior in group h
countries. First, if the endowment in group h countries is at a value that these countries
are indifferent between default and repay, then Lemma 1.2 implies that
b′h = bh − qˆ′hb′h
b′h = bh − q˜′hb′h
which implies
ψ′
(
yL + b
′
h + bˆ
′
f
)
= ψ′
(
yL + bh − qˆ′hb′h + bf − qˆ′f bˆ′f
)
ψ′
(
yL + b
′
h
)
= ψ′
(
yL + bh − q˜′hb′h
)
and thus
qˆ′h = q˜
′
h = δ
That is, default decisions by group f countries do not affect the bond price in group h
countries in this situation. Second, if yh is higher and group h countries strictly prefer
to repay, Lemma 1.4 implies
b′h > bh − q˜′hb′h
and thus
ψ′
(
yL + b
′
h
)
< ψ′
(
yL + bh − q˜′hb′h
)
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⇒
q˜′h =
δψ′ (yL + b′h)
ψ′
(
yL + bh − q˜′hb′h
) < δ
Assume that ψ′′′ (·) > 0, which is standard under a class of functions such as CRRA.
Notice that under the case of yˆf , the net repayment from group f countries are equalized
in both periods. That is, the fact that group f countries choose to repay under yˆf would
bring the lenders the same incremental in both period consumption. Assuming that the
second order effect will not reduce the lenders’ period 1 consumption too much to
overturn the whole result1 , then we have
ψ′
(
yL + b
′
h + bˆ
′
f
)
ψ′
(
yL + bh − qˆ′hb′h + bf − qˆ′f bˆ′f
) > ψ′ (yL + b′h)
ψ′
(
yL + bh − q˜′hb′h
)
and thus
qˆ′h > q˜
′
h
A.1.6 Proof of Lemma 1.6
Proof. Consider two possible endowment realizations in group f countries, yˆf and y˜f
such that yˆf , y˜f ∈
[
y, y
]
and yˆf > y˜f . Furthermore, both yˆf and y˜f are large enough
such that group f countries strictly prefer to repay their debt in period 1 under both
two endowment realizations. Lemma 1.4 implies
bˆ′f > b˜
′
f
bf − qˆ′f bˆ′f < bf − q˜′f b˜′f
Assuming again that the second order effect will not increase the lenders’ period 1
consumption too much to overturn the whole result2 , the concavity of ψ (·) implies
ψ′
(
yL + b
′
h + bˆ
′
f
)
ψ′
(
yL + bh − qˆ′hb′h + bf − qˆ′f bˆ′f
) < ψ′
(
yL + b
′
h + b˜
′
f
)
ψ′
(
yL + bh − q˜′hb′h + bf − q˜′f b˜′f
)
That is, qˆ′h < q˜
′
h.
1 This is true if both bh and yh are sufficiently small, and thus b
′
h is sufficiently small. An extreme
example is bh = 0 and yh = (1− λ)E (yh) + ε for ε > 0 and sufficiently small, then b′h = ε. Because ε
is sufficiently small, then the second order effect is sufficiently small as well.
2 Again, this is true if both bh and yh are sufficiently small, and thus b
′
h is sufficiently small.
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A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof. It is easy to see that q′h is independent of yf if Df = 1. On the other hand,
consider an extreme case of bf = 0 and let y˜f ≤ (1− λ)E (yf ). Let b˜′f and q˜′f be the
associated new bond issuance in these countries, Lemma 1.2 implies that net repayments
by group f countries in both periods equal to 0
bf − q˜′f b˜′f = y˜f − y˜df = bˆ′f = 0
That is, by choosing bf = 0, the wealth effect has been completely shut off in this case
3
. In fact, the only interdependence is the substitution effect. Hence, when group f
countries are in the market, the bond price in group h countries is strictly lower than
the bond price when group f countries are defaulting. Intuitively, the substitution effect
in this case will impose a downward pressure on the borrowing condition in group h
countries when group f countries have a relatively high endowment. Furthermore, by
Lemma 1.3, we also know that b′f is increasing in yf and bf − q′fb′f is decreasing in yf .
Hence, the substitution effect is larger for a larger yf , and thus the bond price in group
h countries is strictly decreasing in yf .
Notice that the discussions above are based on the extreme case of bf = 0 so that
group f countries never choose to default. However, in the case of bf > 0, if group f
net repayments in period 2 is higher than the net repayments in period 1 to a sufficient
extent, the substitution effect will still dominate the wealth effect, and thus imposes a
net downward pressure on the borrowing condition in group h countries. Given b′f is
strictly increasing in yf if yf > (1− λ)E (yf ), and we have the net repayment in period
1 equals bf−q′fb′f , it is easy to see that such an argument is more likely to be valid if bf is
sufficiently small and yf is sufficiently high. That is, there exist a threshold, Y ∈
[
y, y
]
,
such that q′h
∣∣
Df=1 ≥ q′h
∣∣
Df=0 if yf ≥ Y and q′h
∣∣
Df=1 < q
′
h
∣∣
Df=0 if yf < Y.
3 Given bf = 0 in this case, the group h countries will never default under any endowment realization.
However, they will be allowed to choose a positive b′h if yh is strictly higher than (1− λ)E (yf ). That
is, the output cost after default should be strictly positive to support any strictly positive new bond
issuance in period 1.
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A.2 Algorithm
The endowment space
[
y, y
]
is discretized into 11 grids using [24]’s method. Specifically,
y equals to 0.83 and y equals to 1.21. The endowment process has an unconditional
mean of 1.04. The debt space
[
b, b
]
take the value of [−0.45, 0.45], and it is discretized
into 31 grids. The computing algorithm is as follows:
1. Make an initial guess of the borrower’s value function, V (s, bh), V
nd (s, bh), and
V d (s, bh).
2. Make an initial guess on the equilibrium price function qh (s, b
′
h).
3. Solve the borrower’s problem to find her value function V˜ (s, bh), V˜
nd (s, bh), and
V˜ d (s, bh); optimal default decision, d (s, bh); optimal policy function, b
′ (s, bh); and
the new equilibrium bond price function, q˜h (s, b
′
h). This maximization involves
the following sub steps:
(a) Taking qh (s, b
′
h) as given, solve the borrower’s maximization problem
V˜ (s, bh) = max
dh
[
(1− dh) V˜ nd (s, bh) + dhV˜ d (s, bh)
]
where V˜ nd (s, bh) is the value of repay and V˜
d (s, bh) is the value of default
V˜ nd (s, bh) = max
b′h

u (yh + q
′
hb
′
h − bh)
+β
∫ y
y
∫ yˆ(B′,y′f ,b′h)
y V
d (s′) f (y′| y) dy′
β
∫ y
y
∫ y
yˆ(B′,y′f ,b
′
h)
V nd (s′, b′h) f (y
′| y) dy′

V˜ d (s, bh) = u
(
ydh
)
+ βθ
∫ y
y
∫ y
y
V nd
(
s′, 0
)
f
(
y′h
∣∣ yh) f (y′f ∣∣ yf) dy′hdy′f
+β (1− θ)
∫ y
y
∫ y
y
V d
(
s′
)
f
(
y′h
∣∣ yh) f (y′f ∣∣ yf) dy′hdy′f
The borrower’s policy functions d (s, bh) and b
′ (s, bh) are obtained by solving
the problem above.
(b) Given b′ (s, bh) and d (s, bh), compute the new equilibrium bond price function
q˜h
(
s, b′h
)
=
∫ y
y
∫ y
yˆ(B′,y′f ,b
′
h)
δψ′ (c′L)
ψ′ (cL)
f
(
y′h
∣∣ yh) f (y′f ∣∣ yf) dy′hdy′f (A.4)
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where
cL (s) = yL +
∑
j=h,f
NRj (s)
NRj (s) = (1−Dj)
[
Bj − q′j
(
B′j
)
B′j
]
(c) Compute the distance between qh (·) and q˜h (·). If it is bigger than the critical
value, then update the guess on qh (·) by using q˜h (·) and repeat steps (b) and
(c). Otherwise, proceed to step 44 .
4. Compute the distance between V (·) and V˜ (·). If it is bigger than the critical
value, then update the guess on V (·), V nd (·) and V d (·) by using V˜ (·), V˜ nd (·),
and V˜ d (·). Repeat step 1 to step3. Otherwise, stop.
4 The computing speed of step (b) to step (c) can be greatly enhanced by solving a fixed point
problem of equation (A.4).
